Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts by Nance, Dale A.
  
 
191 
Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts 
Dale A. Nance∗ 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
II.  THE “RELIABILITY” REQUIREMENT: A CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE 
• The Core Idea of Reliability 
• Alternative Forms of the Reliability Requirement 
• Reliability as Non-Binary 
• Dichotomy by Deference 
• Dichotomy without Deference 
• The Downside of Dichotomy 
• Reliability and Related Gradational Attributes 
III.  TOWARD A POLICY-BASED BALANCING FRAMEWORK 
• Avoiding Blind Alleys 
• Connecting Reliability to Counterweights 
• Offsetting Jury Credulity 
• Monitoring Adversarial Presentations 
• Marshaling Cognitive Resources 
• Securing Better Evidence 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 and Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael,2 the United States Supreme Court set the law of expert 
testimony on a quest for “reliability.”  These decisions, as well as the 
subsequent amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, make it 
clear that trial judges are to perform a “gatekeeping” function, 
filtering out offered testimony when the expertise on which it is 
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based, whether scientific or otherwise, is not reliable.  Rule 702 now 
provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.3 
Conditions (1)-(3) were added in 2000 in response to the teachings 
of Daubert and Kumho Tire. 
These developments have spawned a substantial literature.4  
Little attention has been given, however, to providing a careful 
analysis of the contours and functions of the reliability concept itself 
and its relationship to the purposes of admissibility rules.5  Daubert 
and Kumho Tire tell us what kinds of factors to examine in order to 
determine whether or not proffered expertise is reliable—factors 
such as whether or not the theory has been tested empirically, and 
whether or not it has been subjected to the rigors of peer review and 
publication6—and the 2000 amendment requires trial courts to 
examine three different respects as to which the question of 
reliability can be assessed.  But these authorities say very little about 
what is meant by reliability or exactly why an interest in reliability 
should be manifested in the decision to exclude proffered evidence.  
In Daubert, for example, the majority opinion states only that 
evidentiary reliability is equivalent to “trustworthiness,” something 
presumably to be demanded, and states this only in a footnote.7 
Without a formula for the synthesis and use of the identified 
factors, which the Supreme Court quite understandably eschews, one 
needs to reflect on how the law of admissibility structures trials in 
order to synthesize all the pertinent considerations into an overall 
reliability assessment that serves the law’s goals.  This Essay 
 
 3 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 4 See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, 
STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 1-65 (2002). 
 5 Some sensible but brief comments are made in this regard by the current 
editors of the McCormick treatise.  See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (John W. 
Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).  An unusually insightful analysis is given in the context of a 
recent proposal that English law adopt a reliability-based exclusionary rule for 
criminal trials.  See MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 116-39 
(2001). 
 6 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-52. 
 7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
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undertakes such a conceptual examination and explores at least some 
of its implications for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony. 
In Part II, I examine the most plausible understandings of the 
reliability requirement, concluding that the best understanding is 
rather different from the way it is commonly and even authoritatively 
expressed.8  I argue that courts and commentators should disavow a 
binary, all-or-nothing concept of reliability—that evidence is either 
reliable or unreliable—in favor of a gradational concept—that the 
reliability of evidence is a matter of degree.  The apparently binary 
mode of expression appearing in Rule 702 is misleadingly conclusory; 
it provides no analytical framework for deciding how reliable is 
reliable enough. 
In Part III, I develop some of the implications of that conclusion, 
suggesting a framework for the courts to use in assessing reliability for 
the purpose of an admissibility ruling.  Not surprisingly, this involves 
weighing the degree of reliability of the proffered expertise against 
the dangers that might arise from admitting the expertise.  But once 
this framework is identified, important conclusions emerge.  
Primarily, I argue that concerns about jury misuse of expertise are 
less important than concerns about controlling advocates so as to 
provide the trier of fact, judge or jury, with expertise that is as reliable 
as the circumstances of the litigation permit.  I suggest one set of ways 
to take this into account in a workable interpretation of the reliability 
requirement in Rule 702. 
To situate the present discussion, I should make an obvious but 
important disclaimer: I do not assert that achieving a satisfactory or 
optimal interpretation of the reliability requirement of Rule 702 is 
the most pressing issue affecting the use of expert testimony.  Various 
reform measures—including greater use of court-appointed 
experts—may well be more important to the administration of justice 
than the interpretive issue discussed here.9  Implementation of such 
reforms might in turn affect the analysis of Rule 702, but no attempt 
is made here to account for such complications. 
II.  THE “RELIABILITY” REQUIREMENT: A CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE 
The Core Idea of Reliability.  As suggested by the Supreme Court’s 
 
 8 In view of the 2000 amendment to Rule 702, I do not address here the 
question of whether the Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert developed the best 
interpretation of that rule as it then read. 
 9 See, e.g., JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT 
LITIGATION 193-211 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of reforms other than strict 
application of admissibility standards). 
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cursory reference to “trustworthiness,” the concept of reliability 
entails a justifiable willingness to rest decision, in some manner, on 
the thing considered reliable.  Reliability is inherently relative to a 
particular decision context, and thus relative to the goal or purpose 
of decision.  In the context of the adjudicative legal norms 
announced in Daubert, Kumho Tire, and revised Rule 702, the 
decisions in question are verdicts, and the principal goal in mind is 
the accuracy of those verdicts, within reasonable constraints of time 
and cost.10  The core idea, then, is a concern for the veritistic 
properties of offered expertise and, perforce, the rules that control 
the admissibility of such expertise.  By “veritistic” I mean the truth 
producing quality of the expertise or the regulative rules, truth 
referring to the factual accuracy of verdicts.11  Evidence, or the rules 
regulating evidence, may be said to be more or less veritistic, more or 
less conducive to accurate verdicts. 
The requirement of reliability purports to be a veritistic 
regulation by imposing some kind of supra-relevance veritistic 
constraint on expertise that is introduced in court.  These two ideas 
are not necessarily conjoined.  One could hold the view that the 
veritistically optimal regulatory scheme is for courts not to concern 
themselves directly with the issue of reliability at the admissibility 
decision.  Sometimes, the best way to reach a goal is for a particular 
decision-maker not to focus directly on the goal itself. 
For example, if the conditions of Coase’s Theorem hold, then a 
court’s decision on the content of the substantive law will not affect 
the efficiency of the rule at issue, so long as the court provides a clear 
rule with reference to which parties are allowed to bargain; if the 
court did not strike upon it, the parties will bargain to the efficient 
solution.12  Under these conditions, assuming that wealth 
 
 10 I consider later the possibility that accuracy of verdicts is not the goal relative 
to which reliability is to be assessed.  See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 11 The indicated conduciveness may be understood in the sense of justification or 
it may be understood in causal terms.  If certain evidence justifies an inference as 
accurate, then the use of that evidence is causally conducive to accurate inference, 
unless the decision making is irrational.  Since the concern for irrational decision 
making (in the form of jury error) is a recurring one in the law of evidence, the 
causal focus is more general and will be employed here.  In this I follow the work of 
epistemologist Alvin Goldman.  See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL 
WORLD (1999).  Although the implications of such a veritistic social epistemology are 
controversial, the general approach is compatible with traditional academic 
conceptions of the goals of evidence law.  Compare Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, 
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001), with Dale 
A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1551 (2001). 
 12 Assuming that parties attempt to maximize wealth, the principal condition that 
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maximization is the principal goal that the court wants to achieve, the 
court should focus not on choosing the allocation of entitlements 
that is more or most efficient, but rather on choosing an allocation 
that is clear and, ceteris paribus, one that is just or fair on non-
efficiency grounds.  A court’s attempt to go after efficiency directly 
could well backfire if its ruling, trying to capture the elusive and 
changing facts that conduce to efficiency, succeeds only in creating a 
rule that is unclear, thus complicating the bargaining process. 
Similarly, a justificatory premise of the adversary system is that 
the clash of opposing, relevant evidence will yield accurate results, at 
least frequently enough to render that system superior to the 
alternatives.13  To the extent that the system is veritistically successful, 
it is due to confluence of two factors.  First, the system encourages 
parties to present all relevant evidence that is reasonably available 
and not too weak to be of practical use, each side in the dispute 
having an incentive to present that which is significant and 
favorable.14  Second, the system provides a trier of fact capable of 
shouldering the responsibility of determining what inferences from 
the evidence are warranted.  Accepting these premises, courts need 
not ordinarily concern themselves with the details of reliability or 
trustworthiness in deciding whether or not to admit evidence; they 
need only exclude that which is irrelevant.15 
Of course, many admissibility rules are based on perceived 
exceptions to this general principle of adversarial veritism.  In 
particular, both the Supreme Court and Congress have decided that 
the proffer of expertise should activate a decision process that looks 
beyond mere relevance, and even beyond expert qualifications, to 
examine the reliability of the expert testimony itself.  But what exactly 
 
must be satisfied is that the transaction costs of rearranging entitlements must not 
exceed the gains from trade.  See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 10 (1960). 
 13 The locus classicus for this argument is Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in 
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961).  The indicated premise 
need not be that adversarial presentation of evidence is more accurate than 
alternatives, only that it is not so much less accurate as to make it an inferior system 
all things considered. 
 14 The importance of having all relevant evidence is that it constitutes a well-
known condition on the validity of inductive inference, often called the principle of 
total evidence.  See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 11, describing his non-categorical 
version as the “truth-in-evidence principle,” articulated as follows: “A larger body of 
evidence is generally a better indicator of the truth-value of a hypothesis than a 
smaller, contained body of evidence, as long as all the evidence propositions are true 
and what they indicate is correctly interpreted.”  Id. at 145. 
 15 Accordingly, the default rules are that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible and 
that relevant evidence is admissible.  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
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does that mean?  And how can this be implemented intelligently 
within an adversarial framework? 
Alternative Forms of the Reliability Requirement.  Authoritative 
expressions of the reliability requirement, both judicial and statutory, 
generally express the requirement in a dichotomous or binary 
fashion.  Proffered expertise is considered either reliable or 
unreliable; reliability, it is implicitly assumed, does not come in 
degrees.16  In Daubert the Court stated, “[U]nder the [Federal] Rules 
[of Evidence] the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”17  
Extending this basic gatekeeping function to all specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702, the majority in Kumho Tire 
opined, “The trial judge’s effort to assure that the specialized 
testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate [the 
expert’s] foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”18  Not 
coincidentally, in each opinion the reliability requirement is 
specifically coupled with the requirement of relevance, which—under 
prevailing legal conceptions—is clearly dichotomous: evidence is 
either relevant or irrelevant; it is not somewhat relevant, very 
relevant, etc.19  Similarly, amended Rule 702 states that, to be 
admitted, proffered expert testimony must be “the product of reliable 
principles and methods,” applied “reliably to the facts of the case.”  
We are thus encouraged to believe that testimony either is or is not 
the product of reliable methods reliably applied. 
The alternative way of expressing the requirement would be to 
say that there must be a showing of “sufficient reliability” for 
admission.  This locution implies a concept of reliability that is 
gradational, a matter of degree.  It is suggested by references in 
Daubert to “the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources 
 
 16 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 203, at 727. 
 17 509 U.S. at 589. 
 18 526 U.S. at 147-49 (quoted language appearing at 149). 
 19 This follows from the definition of relevance that is now widely accepted and 
incorporated into the federal rules: “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 401.  Under the linguistic conventions of the federal 
rules, expressions like “somewhat relevant” and “highly relevant” are simply 
imprecise ways of expressing something about the probative value of the evidence, a 
notion that is clearly gradational.  Probative value can be low or high, very low or very 
high, etc.  See Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 733 
(1986) (discussing formal measures of probative value). 
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of information’,”20 a locution that presupposes reliability can be 
“more” or “less” as well as “most.”  It may also surface with the 
reference in Rule 702(1) to “sufficient facts and data.”  And it clearly 
emerges in the drafters comment on the revised rule that numerous 
factors are relevant “in determining whether expert testimony is 
sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact.”21  I will argue 
that this conception of reliability is clearly superior, relative to the 
task we ask courts to perform.  This in turn accounts for the tendency 
of some commentators, in restating the requirement articulated in 
Daubert, Kumho Tire, and revised Rule 702, to slip into the “sufficient 
reliability” formulation.22 
The problem, of course, with expressing the requirement in the 
latter way, a problem that may explain why that locution is often 
avoided, is that, without some reasonably determinate algorithm 
based on appropriate legal norms that would specify what degree of 
reliability is “sufficient” for this purpose, the requirement of sufficient 
reliability is vacuous.  It tells us almost nothing.23  Using the 
dichotomous or binary form of expression might conceal this gap by 
suggesting either that reliability is a straightforwardly binary factual 
question, akin to the preliminary question of whether a document 
offered in court is the original thereof,24 or that there is some 
criterion of reliability that can be applied without directly invoking 
such an algorithm.25  If such suggestions are false, then what is 
needed is a specification of not only the considerations that weigh 
against admission of (assumedly) relevant expertise, but also some 
indication of how to determine at what level of reliability these 
counterweights ought to be controlling.  The latter specification can 
be purposive (laying out the purpose to be achieved and allowing the 
trial courts to pursue the goal) or formulaic (providing a formula 
that can be employed without reference to the purpose), or some of 
 
 20 509 U.S. at 591 n.9, 592 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note) 
(emphasis added). 
 21 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (emphasis 
added). 
 22 See, e.g., Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint 
“Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 617, 621 (2002). 
 23 Of course, the mere fact that a requirement of “sufficient reliability” is posited 
by the Court and Congress tells the trial courts that some decision about reliability 
should be made, as opposed to none.  This message, however, gives no guidance 
about how to make the reliability determination. 
 24 See FED. R. EVID. 1001, 1002. 
 25 By using the term “algorithm,” I do not intend to connote quantification or 
computational precision, merely an intelligibly complete specification of an 
analytical framework or procedure, something more informative than simply an 
injunction to “solve the problem.” 
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each. Despite the principal terminology used in Daubert, Kumho Tire, 
and Rule 702, the new standard can be interpreted as attempting, 
however confusingly and incompletely, such a hybrid instruction. 
In fact, we often acknowledge that dichotomous antecedents in 
legal rules really reflect such weighing algorithms.  Take the cause of 
action for negligence.  Expressed in dichotomous fashion, we have: if 
defendant was negligent (and the other elements of the cause of 
action are present), compensation should be paid; if defendant was 
not negligent, compensation should not be paid (under a negligence 
theory).  We all understand, do we not, that “negligence” is a 
conclusion derived from some sort of normatively informed risk 
algorithm, not an observable or discernible fact.26  In the rule, “If 
defendant was negligent, compensation should be paid,” the term 
“negligent” is simply a place-holder for such an algorithm; it carries 
no independent force, except to alert us to the fact that the 
referenced algorithm relates to the question of what degree of care is 
socially demanded. 
The dichotomous form of the reliability requirement could be 
meant, or at least it could operate, in this way.  If so, it is simply a less 
transparently vacuous form of the “sufficient reliability” 
requirement.27  We accept that reliability comes in degrees, and are 
told implicitly that there are reasons to exclude evidence even 
though it has more than de minimis reliability.  The requirement of 
reliability then says little more than this: identify those reasons and 
decide whether they outweigh the law’s default principle of admitting 
any evidence possessing probative value.  In such a scheme, the 
reliability requirement of Rule 702 is either redundant of the 
balancing test of Rule 403,28 or it rather cryptically imposes 
restrictions at least in some ways more demanding than Rule 403, 
restrictions that need to be elucidated. 
Reliability as Non-Binary.  The Court in Daubert identified 
reliability, in the context of scientific evidence, with scientific 
 
 26 The algorithm might be a cost-benefit calculation a la Learned Hand, an 
elaboration of a categorical imperative a la Kant, or yet some other idea. 
 27 Even before Daubert was decided, Professor Moenssens asserted the importance 
of reliability assessments, using dichotomous reliability terminology, but then felt 
impelled to recognize that such a concept of reliability is a conclusion, a “value 
judgment,” derived from the weighing of legal norms.  See Andre Moenssens, 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence—An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 545, 564-67 (1984). 
 28 FED. R. EVID. 403: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
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validity.29  The nature of the problem is thus illuminated by a 
digression relating to scientific validity.  A quick review of some of the 
Daubert factors demonstrates why scientific validity is not easily 
understood in binary terms, except once again as the expression of a 
conclusion relative to some particular task. 
Consider the first “factor” adduced for the assessment of the 
reliability of a purportedly scientific theory or technique: “whether it 
can be (and has been) tested.”30  How much testing does it take 
before a principle or technique can be said to have been “tested” for 
this purpose?  Good scientists know that replication of results is an 
important part of the scientific method.  Can, then, a principle or 
technique be considered “tested” if only one test has ever been 
conducted?  Two?  Three?  Does it not depend on the quality of the 
tests as well as their quantity?  If so, this points to a concept of testing 
that is a matter of degree, more testing being better than less, ceteris 
paribus, and testing that is more closely related to the proposition of 
interest being better than testing that is more distant.31 
Similarly, if subjection to the demands of peer review and 
publication is an important factor, as the Court opines,32 it should 
matter how rigorous the peer review of a particular publication is, 
and that is surely a matter of degree as to which not all publications 
are alike.33  Relatedly, although the degree of acceptance of a 
principle or technique within a particular community of experts is 
certainly pertinent to an assessment of the degree of its reliability, 
little should turn on the artificial question of whether that degree of 
acceptance has passed from just below to just over 50% of the 
relevant community.  Better is for courts to appreciate the degree of 
the support in the relevant community in deciding what to do with 
the proffer under some standard that does not make general 
 
 29 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (“In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability 
will be based upon scientific validity”); id. at 592-93 (stating that the trial judge’s 
reliability determination “entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning 
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue”). 
 30 Id. at 593. 
 31 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.2[2], at 35 (“Only through replications, 
using various designs and methods, do scientists gain confidence that a hypothesis 
has been sufficiently corroborated.  No magic number or moment determines this 
point, however; like many areas of the law, science presents a broad spectrum of 
grays that over time sharpens into black and white.”). 
 32 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
 33 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.3 (noting variance in the status of 
journals and the quality of peer reviews). 
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acceptance a touchstone.34 
Then there is the matter of “error rates.”35  How precisely must 
we know the error rate of a particular technique?  And what does one 
make of a technique with a known, very high error rate?  The rate 
may be known with some precision, but that does not mean the 
technique gets a “yes” answer to this component of the reliability 
inquiry.  Rather, the question must be transformed into one that 
inquires how large the known error rate can be before the technique 
must be rejected by the courts as unhelpful.  That is a “How high is 
too high?” question, not a “Yes or no?” question.36  The same is true 
for the maintenance of standards controlling a techniques operation, 
considered as an indicium of reliability.37 
These quick observations could be multiplied easily.  They point 
to a fact that scientists, at least sophisticated ones, surely understand: 
scientific validity is not an all-or-nothing characteristic; rather, it is a 
matter of degree.38  This proposition poses the question of how one 
gets from a consideration of the degree of scientific validity to the 
undeniably binary decision of whether or not to admit proffered 
testimony.  Of course, the same question is posed by the notion of 
validity as a synonym or proxy for the reliability of non-scientific 
expertise.  Thus, the fundamental problem is how to map from a 
 
 34 Indeed, the Daubert opinion does not state starkly that majority approval is 
significant in and of itself, even as a “factor”; rather, quoting an earlier Third Circuit 
opinion, it states, 
A “reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, 
explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express 
determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that 
community.”  Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in 
ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known technique which 
has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,” 
may properly be viewed with skepticism. 
509 U.S. at 594 (internal citations omitted). 
 35 “[I]n the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should 
consider the known or potential rate of error” as a pertinent factor.  Id. 
 36 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.2[1], at 35 (noting that “any science 
that is even slightly better than flipping a coin” is likely to meet the test of “assisting 
the trier of fact,” so that Rule 702 “must embody, at least in part, a Rule 403 
analysis”). 
 37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 38 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4, at 25 (“[A]s every scientist knows, validity 
is not a categorical conclusion.”); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING 
SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1999) (“‘Validity’ in 
science is not a binary attribute, like pregnancy.”); Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of 
Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. 
REV. 1047, 1062 (1999) (“The Supreme Court . . . failed to acknowledge that . . . 
scientific reliability is not an all-or-nothing proposition, but rather depends on the 
application of the evidence and the acceptable risk of error.”). 
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gradational epistemic conception of reliability to a dichotomous legal choice on 
admissibility.  The following sections consider the options available for 
solving this problem. 
Dichotomy by Deference.  Perhaps the Supreme Court intended a 
dichotomous reliability requirement that can be determined by 
reference to more or less factual propositions about the standards of 
non-legal institutions or their proper application, without the aid of a 
legal-policy informed algorithm of the type described above.  Indeed, 
there is much language in Daubert that suggests this.  As already 
noted, the Court’s opinion identifies reliability, in the context of 
scientific evidence, with scientific validity.  That would appear to be a 
more or less factual (at least, non-legal) inquiry into the application 
of standards of scientific inquiry specified by the scientific 
community.39  The well-known factors identified in the Court’s 
opinion seem to have a similarly factual and deferential character: 
Has the theory or principle been tested?  Does it have a known error 
rate?  Has it been published and subjected to peer review?  Has the 
principle been applied according to standards developed by the 
scientific community?  Does it enjoy general acceptance among the 
relevant scientific community?40 
To be sure, the Court made a point of refusing to provide a 
means of determining how many “yes” answers to the five questions 
posed above are required before reliability is established.  And if, as I 
have argued above, it makes little sense to talk in terms of looking for 
“yes” or “no” answers to the questions posed by the Court’s 
enumerated factors, the problem of synthesis is all the more difficult.  
This, however, is actually consistent with the idea that the Court is 
deferring to the norms of the scientific community: The Court has no 
particular skill for answering the synthetic question ex ante; rather, it 
must be answered by investigation, more or less the way a court in 
state X decides a question of law governed by the law of state Y.  In 
this case, however, state Y is the State of Science, a state with no 
recognized supreme court.  Moreover, because the Court 
acknowledged that yet other questions might need to be answered, 
that other factors might need to be considered, no fixed formula can 
be specified.  The Court understandably concedes the imperfections 
in its knowledge of, and thus its ability to articulate ex ante, the validity 
 
 39 See Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert 
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 231 (2000) (“The move from Frye to Daubert increases 
judges’ gatekeeping duty by requiring them to evaluate claims of scientific expertise 
much as scientists would.”). 
 40 See 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
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laws of the State of Science. 
Those familiar with admissibility standards in the mold of Frye v. 
United States41 may quibble with my use of the term “deferential” to 
describe this interpretation of Daubert’s reliability inquiry.  Daubert, 
after all, rejected Frye as a matter of statutory interpretation, and Frye 
represented deference to the scientific community.42  From a broader 
perspective, however, Daubert might be understood as endorsing 
simply a different kind of deference.  Fyre mandated deference to the 
collective opinion of scientists in the relevant field concerning the 
validity of the proffered expertise.  Daubert might be understood as 
mandating instead deference to the norms of science, norms that 
must be applied directly by trial and appellate judges, without 
accepting the collective opinion of scientists as a conclusive proxy for 
validity.43  This interpretation of Daubert cannot be rejected simply 
because Daubert rejected Frye-type deference. 
 Still, it is hard to believe that this non-Frye form of deference is 
what the Court really intended, or would intend if it had clearly 
thought the matter through.  The obvious problem, one frequently 
noted, is that judges must become junior scientists in order to try to 
apply the normative standards of the scientific community.  This is a 
task that some judges are probably incapable of performing 
adequately, and one certainly that some judges believe they are 
incapable of performing adequately.44  It is complicated by 
disagreement among scientists and philosophers of science regarding 
the norms of scientific disciplines, disagreement of which there is 
barely a hint in the Court’s opinions.45  This difficulty, however real in 
some cases, may be somewhat exaggerated.  In many contexts of 
ordinary science, it surely is possible for judges, with some assistance, 
to make reasonable calls that would parallel those of good scientists 
who have not lost their objectivity.46 
 
 41 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (applying a “general acceptance in the particular 
field” test for novel scientific evidence). 
 42 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-89. 
 43 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.0, at 13 (comparing Frye and Daubert). 
 44 See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, at 598-601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part) 
(casting doubt on the ability of judges to perform the contemplated task); Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kozinski, J., on 
remand, bemoaning the Supreme Court’s “Brave New World” in which judges must 
decide whether a qualified scientist’s testimony is “good science” “derived by the 
scientific method.”). 
 45 See generally David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: 
The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
685 (2000). 
 46 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE 
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The more fundamental question is this: Why should the final 
determination, reliable or not in court, be determined by the norms 
of the scientific community instead of those of the legal community 
(other than the legal norm of deference itself)?  If the scientific 
community recognizes scientific validity as a gradational, non-binary 
concept, as I think it does and must, then that community must 
employ one or more normatively informed, more or less determinate 
algorithms of its own for making any categorical determinations of 
validity that it is called upon to make.  These norms will have 
developed to serve the interests of science or, more precisely, the 
scientific community.47  And if the scientific community sometimes 
thinks of scientific validity as an all-or-nothing concept, it is only 
because that community has developed dichotomous rules of thumb 
that, while over- and under-inclusive in some cases, roughly serve to 
further those interests.  Why then should the scientific community’s 
balancing of those interests, whether consciously and directly or 
indirectly by the application of rules of thumb, be taken as 
controlling the conduct of litigation? 
Three initially plausible reasons can be identified, though each 
must be rejected in the end.48  First, it might be thought that the 
purposes and goals of the scientific community are the same as those 
of the law of adjudication, or at least so nearly the same that the 
difference is not worth much concern.  This supposed reason, 
however, is not likely to hold true in the scientific context.  To be 
sure, both disciplines place a high priority on the ascertainment of 
truth by the application of relatively formal procedures.  But the 
parameters that give shape to this quest differ noticeably: those of 
good adjudication include, for example, an emphasis on promptness 
and finality of decision that is incompatible with the goals of science, 
as Justice Blackmun himself observed pointedly in Daubert.49 
 
LAW 64 (1999) (“[M]ost judges are intelligent and well educated and there is no 
reason why they cannot with diligence master the basics of the scientific method and 
statistical theory.”). 
 47 I do not mean to imply that these interests are narrow or selfish, just that they 
are accepted within the scientific community.  On the other hand, that does not 
preclude the possibility of significant rent-seeking, including the shaping of norms so 
as to augment public funding of scientific research. 
 48 A fourth possible reason actually has considerable merit.  It is based on the 
assertion by the proponent or its expert that the expertise is scientifically sound.  This 
certainly provides a reason to defer to scientific standards, at least as part of the 
analysis.  This reason, however, which depends on the precise claim being made by 
the proponent, is readily accommodated within a framework that employs a 
gradational reliability concept and a balancing test.  See infra notes 185-93 and 
accompanying text. 
 49 509 U.S. at 596-97. 
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For example, the law’s concession to unavoidable doubt often 
entails an aversion to false negatives (e.g., refusing to impose civil 
liability on defendant for want of proof of causation when its product 
did in fact cause plaintiff’s injury) that is almost as strong as its 
aversion to false positives (e.g., imposing liability when defendant’s 
product did not cause the plaintiff’s injury).50  This trade-off is not 
reflected in the typical scientific standards of hypothesis testing, 
themselves important norms of scientific validity.51  Thus, the 
conservative convention in social science that (generally) insists on 
results that possess a statistical “p value” of less than 0.05 before a 
difference among one or more comparison groups will be deemed 
“statistically significant” is an inferential norm that gives priority to 
the avoidance of false positive conclusions.  The idea is that, with a 
risk of false positive conclusions greater than 5% were the “null 
hypothesis” of “no difference” true, that hypothesis cannot safely be 
rejected.  In that case, scientists are prepared to leave the matter in 
limbo pending further study.  The law of trials, however, cannot so 
indefinitely postpone making a judgment, but must rely on whatever 
evidence is reasonably available at the time of decision.52  Even in 
criminal cases, this difference is significant, most conspicuously in 
assessing evidence offered by the accused. 
These observations reflect the fact that the argument from 
identity of goals is profoundly incomplete without an explanation of 
how legal admissibility norms, which concern the helpfulness of 
information in reaching an accurate and final verdict on particular 
events in accordance with the applicable burden of persuasion in an 
adversarial system, map to scientific validity norms, which relate to the 
permissibility of scientists deriving revisable conclusions about the 
 
 50 Almost, but not quite.  See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 
HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 647, 659-72 (1994) (arguing that a false positive verdict is 
more serious than a false negative one whenever the former entails an imputation of 
serious wrongdoing by the defendant but the latter does not entail an imputation of 
serious wrongdoing by the plaintiff). 
 51 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1164-67 (1994) (discussing this difference in the context of the 
epidemiological evidence in Daubert); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance 
Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 300-02 (2001) (emphasizing 
differences between law’s assessment of causation and scientific assessments of 
causation); Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 1099-1102 (same). 
 52 The point is carefully examined in Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil 
Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 943 (2003); see also David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of 
Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1983) (explaining the complex 
relationship between statistical significance and the burden of persuasion). 
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general patterns of causation drawn from data or information.  While it 
is fairly safe to assume that such scientifically well-grounded 
conclusions are going to be helpful in lawsuits to which they are 
relevant, the converse cannot be safely assumed.  Scientific validity, as 
understood by scientists, should not be considered necessary in all 
cases for adjudicative helpfulness.53 
The second possible reason to defer in this way is more subtle.  
Even if the criterion of sufficient reliability for conclusions in science 
is seriously different from the theoretically appropriate criterion of 
sufficient reliability for admissibility in adjudication, the law might 
choose to defer to the scientific criterion simply to avoid controversy, 
to use a more determinate scientific criterion in place of a more 
debatable legal criterion.  This argumentative candidate has at least a 
chance of success in the context of scientific evidence, because 
portions of the scientific community have standards of reliability that 
are reasonably determinate in some contexts. 
Ultimately, however, it is unconvincing.  The voluminous post-
Daubert litigation has shown that the new standards have hardly 
avoided controversy.  Relatedly, because of the significant difference 
between the goals and purposes of the law and those of science, an 
inevitable tension will arise in attempting to maintain this kind of 
deference.  Courts will be pulled to develop more pertinent legal 
standards, even in the face of potential controversy about the content 
thereof.  In any event, the failure of such deference, to the extent 
based on this consideration, would be well deserved.  Avoiding 
controversy does not really concern the kind of costs that properly 
should be balanced against our interest in accuracy.  Rather, it 
involves trading off (rather unsuccessfully at that) the goals of the law 
for the convenience and comfort of judges and the rest of the 
political establishment.54 
Perhaps, however, the avoidance of controversy is not really the 
point.  We can recast this into a third argument for deference if we 
are willing to relax more candidly the assumption that accuracy of 
verdicts is the primary consideration with respect to which reliability 
 
 53 See generally Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and 
the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 971-78 (1999) (noting 
that the majority opinion in Daubert failed to realize the implications of its 
acknowledgment of the differences between law and science). 
 54 Some kinds of costs obviously must constitute counterweights to the admission 
of relevant evidence and indeed to the implementation of all rules that are veritistic 
in design.  There are limits to the amount of social resources that should be allocated 
to improving accuracy of decision.  The experience of controversy may be unsettling, 
but it is a cost we expect judges to endure in the course of adjudicating disputes, at 
least if it cannot be reduced without sacrificing accuracy. 
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is required.  Suppose instead that public confidence in verdicts is the 
primary consideration.55  If so, then a desire to create or maintain an 
undeserved public confidence that verdicts reflect the certain truth 
might cause the Court and Congress to insist that seemingly scientific 
experts testify only when their underlying expertise meets some 
demanding standards employed in scientific investigation.  In a civil 
case involving a plaintiff’s offer of ostensible expertise that does not 
meet the standards of science, the tortured thinking might run like 
this: If the jury decides in favor of the plaintiff, and the public 
becomes aware (as indeed the media will make sure they do) that 
some of the evidence in the case was not up to scientific standards, 
then the public might believe that the jury was duped into relying 
excessively upon that particular piece of expertise (as indeed the 
defense will publicly assert).  Thus, the public will come to doubt the 
veracity of the jury’s verdict, even if that verdict is entirely proper. 
This, too, is ultimately unsatisfactory as a justification of 
deference, even if the embedded behavioral assumptions are true.  
Within a broad range of normal applications, public confidence in 
the law, though certainly important, is a value that should remain 
subordinate (indeed, lexicographically inferior) to accuracy of 
inference and decision in accordance with the established burden of 
persuasion.  Moreover, in the long run, to sacrifice these goals for the 
sake of public confidence is likely to endanger the very public 
confidence that is desired.  Playing the public confidence game can 
backfire once it becomes public that this is the game being played.56 
Is the situation different for non-scientific expertise, what Rule 
702 refers to as “technical or other specialized knowledge”?  There 
are serious, practical disciplines, such as clinical medicine, for which 
it can be said that the parameters of decision, such as the priority 
given to accuracy, promptness, and even finality, are more akin to 
those of adjudication than are the pure sciences.  We recognize this 
in myriad ways, such as the important deference represented by the 
exception to the hearsay rule contained within Rule 703, allowing 
expert opinions to be based on facts or data that are not necessarily 
admissible if they are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
 
 55 Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?  On Judicial Proof and the 
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (arguing that many rules of 
admissibility and sufficiency are attributable to an explicit or implicit policy of 
generating verdicts acceptable to the public, whether accurate or not). 
 56 In the same way, the value of impartiality in the decision-maker should carry a 
higher priority than the value, important as it is, of projecting an appearance of 
impartiality to the public, and one of the best (though not infallible) means for 
maintaining the appearance of impartiality is to maintain real impartiality. 
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the particular field in forming opinions of inferences upon the 
subject.”57  Although this provision facially does not distinguish 
among different types of expertise, the conspicuous illustration 
usually given to justify it is the physician making “life-and-death 
decisions” based on hospital records, X-rays, and statements by the 
patient’s relatives and other medical personnel.58 
On the other hand, there are countless forms of “specialized 
knowledge,” ranging from astrology to plumbing, for which this is not 
true.  And some non-scientific disciplines, even some that have been 
regularly employed in litigated cases for decades, have little or no 
extra-disciplinary checks on reliability.59  As recent debates have made 
clear, this may be especially true for disciplines, such as handwriting 
identification, that have been developed for, and find little 
application other than, forensic uses.60  To defer to the normative 
standards of reliability in such disciplines would be to abdicate the 
basic gatekeeping function.61  As a general strategy, therefore, 
deference to the reliability norms of non-legal institutions is no more 
plausible in the context of non-scientific expertise than it is with 
regard to scientific expertise. 
The law of admissibility might attempt to tailor this discipline by 
discipline, deferring only to those non-legal institutional norm 
systems that generate reliability standards fairly close to those that 
law’s normative, policy-based prescriptions would yield directly.  But 
why go to this trouble?  It would, after all, require the same non-
deferential assessment that, under a more generally non-deferential 
approach, would have to be done directly, except that it would be 
 
 57 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 58 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (distinguishing as impermissible 
the case of an accidentologist relying on reports of bystanders who observed an 
accident). 
 59 Even in a context like conventional medicine, there may be good reasons to 
doubt the reliability of decision making; a nominal concern for accuracy, 
promptness, and finality that is similar to the law’s may not in fact translate into a 
degree of reliability that the law should consider appropriate for the resolution of 
disputes.  See, e.g., John M. Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean?  Can the Law and 
Medicine Be Reconciled?,  26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 369, 369-70 (2001) (“[T]here is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that most clinicians’ practices do not reflect the 
principles of evidence-based medicine but rather are based on tradition, their most 
recent experience, what they learned years ago in medical school, or what they have 
heard from their friends.”). 
 60 See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative 
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1091 (1998). 
 61 This, of course, is not to say that the degree to which a proposed expert follows 
the normative standards of his or her own discipline is irrelevant to a reliability 
assessment.  Significant divergence is a red flag suggesting bias and calls for 
explanation. 
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attempted over whole classes of expertise.  Moreover, to use a 
deferential standard for some categories of expertise and a non-
deferential standard for others would require a kind of disciplinary 
line-drawing that was rejected in Kumho Tire.  Affirming the 
applicability of the reliability standard to all kinds of expertise, 
whether or not commonly regarded as “scientific,” the majority 
rightly opined that, while the factors that might be useful is assessing 
reliability should vary with context, no distinction between science 
and non-science can be doctrinally justified or practicably 
maintained.62  The same constraints prevent us from using a 
deferential, dichotomous reliability concept for some non-scientific 
expertise but not others. 
Indeed, Kumho Tire represents the end of the deferential regime 
that Daubert might seem to have put in place, notwithstanding the 
emphasis placed on professional standards.63  When Daubert tied 
reliability (for scientific evidence) to the idea of scientific validity and 
suggested factors that might be taken into account in assessing 
validity, the opinion left unclear whether the judiciary should use 
those factors because the judgment of (hypothetical) good scientists 
is determinative, or rather because those factors are generally useful 
tools for reaching a legal-policy based assessment of validity that may 
or may not accord with what scientific norms would require.  Kumho 
Tire appears to have resolved this question: “[A] trial court should 
consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are 
reasonable measures of the reliability of the expert testimony.”64  
What is “reasonable,” in turn, is a matter of legal policy, not scientific 
policy.65  Kumho Tire thus frees Daubert to allow that there is an 
important analytical difference, even in the context of scientific 
evidence, between legal norms of reliability and norms of validity or 
reliability that inform the inference processes in any non-legal 
discipline that is invoked in testimony.66 
 
 62 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-49. 
 63 See id. at 152 (indicating that one purpose of the reliability requirement is to 
assure that an expert employs “the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes 
the practice of an expert in the relevant field”); see supra note 61. 
 64 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. 
 65 Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.5.1, at 43 (“Whether the basis for a 
proffered expert opinion is valid depends on what that opinion is, and what 
consequences follow from it.  This is a matter of policy, not science.”). 
 66 I am not suggesting any extreme post-modernism, any wholly social 
construction of truth.  I present no challenge to the philosophically conventional 
thrust of the reliability factors identified by the Supreme Court and lower courts or 
the essentially veritistic aims associated with them.  Of course, what is taken as true 
after a trial, the verdict upon which legal action is taken, is certainly a proposition 
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Dichotomy without Deference.  Having rejected deference, we should 
consider whether it is possible to maintain such a dichotomous 
reliability concept without invoking sub silentio a policy-based 
balancing formula that renders the supposedly binary determination 
simply a report of the conclusion obtained by such balancing.  Is 
there a way to map facts, including non-legal institutional facts, to 
such a dichotomous legal determination of reliability?  The answer is 
certainly, “Yes,” but again it is very hard to find a workable 
formulation that is compatible with established doctrine and 
institutional capacities. 
What exactly are we looking for here?  One possibility is a binary 
factual determination the satisfaction of which, by the consequent 
admission of evidence, can be expected to improve verdict accuracy.  
A direct approach would have courts make assessments of the overall 
propensity of certain evidence to yield accurate verdicts.  That is, 
proffered expertise would be considered reliable if its admission has 
the propensity to produce more accurate verdicts, in all cases or at 
least in cases of this type.67  Alternatively, the suggestion might be that 
judges should assess directly whether admission will achieve the 
proper balance between the risk of false positive verdicts and the risk 
of false negative verdicts.68  These suggestions are problematic, 
however, if they assume that the judge, in making admissibility 
rulings, uses knowledge of the truth about the disputed material 
facts.  The reliability inquiry should not lead to a practice of using 
 
that might diverge from what, on purely epistemic grounds, one ought to believe to 
be true, if for no other reason than the fact that considerable relevant evidence is 
privileged and thus removed from consideration.  That does not alter the fact that 
the primary objective of the trial is veritistic, looking to the accurate application of 
substantive law to probable adjudicative facts.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
85 (1971) (“The theory of trials examines which procedures and rules of evidence, 
and the like, are best calculated to advance this purpose consistent with the other 
ends of the law.”). 
 67 Analogously, speaking about the evaluation of social practices in terms of the 
accuracy of its user’s beliefs (the beliefs’ “veritistic value” or “V-value”), Professor 
Goldman writes: 
Suppose the range of pertinent applications of the practice has been 
settled.  Theoretically, then, we can take the average (mean) 
performance of the practice across those applications as a measure of 
its V-value.  If on average the practice increases the V-values of the 
user’s belief states, the practice has positive V-value.  If on average it 
decreases the V-values of the user’s belief states, the practice has 
negative V-value.  And if on average it leaves the V-values of the beliefs 
unchanged, the V-value of the practice is neutral. 
GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 92. 
 68 See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without 
Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 266-67 (2003). 
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admissibility to engineer what the trial judge believes to be the right 
verdict.  On the other hand, such suggestions presumably mean 
something more demanding than simply the exclusion of expertise 
that does not assist the trier of fact.69  If, then, the indicated 
suggestions are to occupy the precarious middle ground between 
these two conceptions of the judicial role, can they work?  I think not, 
for they suffer from even more daunting practical difficulties than the 
deferential approach. 
The difficulty already noted—that judges under Daubert must 
become surrogate experts in the relevant field—is thereby 
compounded by a different problem.  Now the greater problem is 
that judges in each context would have to become a special kind of 
expert, predicting the impact of alleged expertise (of whatever 
species) on the adjudication of disputes.  In the vast majority of 
contexts, moreover, this would have to be done without the benefit of 
extant social science regarding the behavior of triers of fact.  For 
example, more so  than having to become an expert in DNA 
technology in order to evaluate some new genetic evidence 
technique, the judge would have to become trained in the analysis of 
the impact of the new technique on juries, presumably as indicated 
by the social science of similar or related techniques, if any exist.  
Without such knowledge, the judiciary would have to proceed based 
on the collective prejudices of the legal profession as they are passed 
from generation to generation.  Suffice it to say, the perspicacity of 
the latter has been shown to be seriously wanting.70 
And there are further problems.  In this context, the 
determination of reliability likely will be dependent on the meaning 
given to “cases of this type.”71  Depending on the range of potential 
applications (admissions) of the contemplated expertise, it might be 
reliable or unreliable.  Nor is this problem avoided by the emphasis 
in Kumho Tire on addressing reliability not in the abstract but rather 
in regard to the “task at hand.”72  Commentators have noted that this 
 
 69 The idea of assisting the trier of fact to perform its factfinding task is addressed 
in Part III, infra. 
 70 Outside the area of experts, empirical research has shown that professional 
expectations about jury behavior are often wide of the mark.  See, e.g., Shari Diamond 
& Neal Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001) 
(reporting results of observations of jury deliberations in regard to discussion of 
insurance); Peter Meine et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay 
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992) (reporting results of mock jury studies in 
regard to hearsay evidence).  On professional expectations of jurors in regard to 
expert testimony, see discussion infra, notes 128-46 and accompanying text. 
 71 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 72 526 U.S. at 141 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). 
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appears to require not a global focus but a local one; reliability must 
be established relative to the particular inference the expert is being 
called upon to make.73  There is an undeniable element of truth here, 
but pressed to its logical conclusion, this would make determinations 
of reliability all but impossible, for the particular task at hand in a 
lawsuit is never replicated in research.  Trials, and the issues that they 
present, are unique events.  In order to make any assessment of 
reliability of a claimed expertise, one must address the veritistic 
propensity of such testimony, the evidence for which is inherently 
statistical, based on experienced frequencies over some class of cases.  
Of course, the “task at hand” should not be understood too broadly—
and certainly some courts have been guilty of such untailored 
analysis—but even with appropriate sharpening of focus, at the 
margin there may remain enough play in the joints that veritistic 
propensities can be manipulated by task selection. 
These problems might be avoided if the courts were to employ a 
reliability test that is less epistemically demanding for judges.  Many 
rules of admissibility that do not concern experts provide models of 
what this might look like. Consider the rule excluding hearsay.  That 
rule does not provide that, when confronted with evidence of a 
statement not made on the stand in the current trial, the trial judge 
should consider designated factors, such as the absence of cross-
examination of the declarant, and weigh these against the probative 
value of such evidence in order to decide admissibility.  Nor does it 
say, more elliptically, that the trial judge should simply weigh all 
competing factors, without specification of what those might be.  
Instead, it requires categorically the exclusion of such a statement 
when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, if it does not 
come within one of the (for the most part equally) factually binary 
exceptions.74  In other words, these dichotomous tests encapsulate, or 
so it is hoped, the goals of the adjudicative law, the most important of 
which in this context is verdict accuracy, but without requiring, at 
least in the ordinary case, any advertence to those goals or the 
balance of competing considerations that relate thereto.  Indeed, this 
in many ways is the essence of rule-governed decision-making.75 
In this vein, one might select one or more dichotomous proxies 
for reliability, each of which tests for one particular and important 
 
 73 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic 
Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000). 
 74 See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII. 
 75 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991). 
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way in which reliability can be undermined.  If the expertise is not 
undermined in one of these specific ways, the expertise satisfies the 
reliability requirement.  Such a proxy test, if well or fortuitously 
designed or evolved, might not be too over-inclusive or under-
inclusive for practical use.  Superficially, this might look like the 
scheme that the Supreme Court initiated with Daubert, its “factors” 
constituting the proxies.  Such a scheme cannot, however, create an 
intelligible dichotomous standard of reliability, unless either (a) only 
a single, dichotomous proxy is used, so that the expertise would be 
deemed “reliable” relative to the present requirement provided the 
single proxy test is passed, or (b) in the multiple proxy context, one 
has a determinate way of synthesizing the results of those tests or 
factor applications into a single, binary judgment without performing 
an independent assessment of reliability.  Pretty clearly, Daubert does 
neither.  Its factors cannot yield simple “yes” or “no” answers; its 
formulation rejects any single factor as determinative; the opinion 
expressly leaves open the possibility of additional pertinent factors; 
and a fortiori it eschews any reasonably determinate means of 
synthesizing the various factors to be considered.76 
Of course, the Court’s reticence does not necessarily mean that 
no such reasonably determinate synthesis is possible, and at least one 
eminent evidence scholar has attempted to provide such a synthesis 
by listing binary conditions for a determination of reliability.  Edward 
Imwinkelried suggests filling out the requirement in the following 
way, at least for scientific evidence: 
[T]here is “enough” validation when the proponent’s foundation 
establishes that an hypothesis has been verified by an empirical 
study which: (1) is based on a large, representative database; (2) 
was conducted under conditions approximating those in the 
instant case; and (3) yielded a validity rate justifying the 
definiteness of the tendered opinion.77 
Like amended Rule 702, this suggestion identifies certain areas of 
interest on which trial judges should focus.  That is certainly helpful, 
as far as it goes, but it soon throws up difficult questions: How large a 
database is large enough?  How representative must it be to support 
this opinion?  How close is close enough for the conditions to 
approximate those of the litigated case?  How high a “validity rate” is 
high enough to justify an opinion of a given definiteness?  These 
 
 76 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-52 (also 
emphasizing ex ante flexibility). 
 77 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule Into 
the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough is Enough Even 
When It is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 50 (1999). 
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questions cannot be understood as binary questions of the type we 
are seeking here.  They can only be answered by assessing what is at 
risk given the degree to which these parameters are not satisfied in 
the proponent’s evidence.  And this means that the criteria stated 
reflect, at best, conclusions of an analysis that implicitly invokes an 
unspecified weighing algorithm.78 
What else might we try?  We might be more modest in the goals 
that a dichotomous reliability concept is expected to achieve.  
Perhaps all that is necessary in the context of an admissibility decision 
is the elimination of expertise that is unreliable in certain specific 
ways that are amenable to dichotomous tests.  For example, drawing 
on the first articulated Daubert factor, suppose the gatekeeping role 
consisted solely of determining whether the basis for an opinion is 
testable.  An expert in prayer is offered to testify that God revealed to 
him during prayer that the defendant is guilty.  God also revealed 
during the same prayer that God will not reveal anything else to the 
expert, certainly not anything that can be independently confirmed.  
In such a context, the expert may be excluded on the ground that 
the basis for his testimony is untestable.  Use of the other Daubert 
factors, suitably developed, could similarly eliminate supposed 
expertise that is defective in particular ways.79 
This might be developed into a coherent admissibility scheme,80 
 
 78 The idea might be that some kind of invisible hand mechanism, say the 
accumulating experience of judges, will allow the intuitive balancing of competing 
considerations without an explicit process of identifying the counterweights.  This 
seems to be the underlying, perhaps unintended, idea in an earlier article by 
Professor Imwinkelried, from which he drew the test here quoted.  See Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Judge as Daubert Gatekeeper: Adapting Old Maps to the Unfamiliar 
Terrain of the “Brave New World,” PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
SCIENCE AND THE LAW 46 (1999), at  http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/179630.pdf 
(categorizing admissibility rulings according to an analogy with the burden of 
production on the merits).  But it is hard to discern the mechanism that would 
produce a desirable convergence of rulings, especially in the rapidly changing arena 
of expert testimony, without explicit attention to the counterweights that determine, 
once the degree of reliability is assessed, how reliable is reliable enough to warrant 
jury consideration in the context of the case. 
 79 Cf. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, at 736 n.65 (arguing that the 
Daubert reliability requirement might be read to exclude only “‘subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation’ and ‘inference[s] or assertion[s] [not] derived by the 
scientific method,’” leaving any further oversight to be carried on pursuant to a 
general balancing of probative value and counterweights, presumably via Rule 403) 
(citation omitted). 
 80 Such an approach would, in fact, bear some similarity to the work of 
philosopher Karl Popper, upon whom the Daubert Court confusingly relied.  See 
Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner, 
26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 217, 230-32 (2001) (criticizing Daubert’s reliance on 
Popper, noting that under Popper’s philosophy of science, a claim or theory cannot 
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but it is definitely not what Daubert mandated.  For Daubert did not 
simply require the exclusion of expertise that is defective in one or 
more of several specified ways.  It mandated that only reliable 
expertise be admitted.  Admission under Daubert, in its dichotomous 
reliability interpretation, thus involves a judicial determination that 
the expertise is reliable, not one that the expertise has not been 
found to be unreliable in designated respects.  Expertise that is 
unreliable (or very unreliable, to put it in gradational terms), but not 
in one of the articulated ways, should not come in under Daubert, but 
would come in under the contemplated scheme.  The two 
frameworks are not compatible. 
The Downside of Dichotomy.  Faced with the very difficult task of 
coming up with a coherent scheme of dichotomous reliability that is 
faithful to the mandates of the Supreme Court and Congress, there is 
some tendency for trial judges to try instead to answer a different, 
more readily answerable, but clearly dichotomous question.  Courts 
might, for example, treat the admissibility decision as a sufficiency 
decision on the merits, excluding the proffered expertise unless it 
possesses sufficient reliability to meet the burden of production, at 
least to the extent the proponent bears such a burden.  With 
exclusion of such evidence often resulting in summary judgment or 
directed verdict, it is tempting to treat the admissibility question as 
determined by the answer to the sufficiency question.  Indeed, there 
is good reason to think this sort of thing is occurring.81 
Treating reliability as a dichotomous characteristic of expert 
testimony thus reinforces a pre-Daubert trend: What some courts 
really have wanted to do in certain toxic tort litigation is to rule on 
the merits against the plaintiff; for want of suitable doctrinal means 
of so doing directly, they struck upon the idea of excluding the 
plaintiff’s critical evidence and then granting the defense summary 
 
be known to be true or even probable, but can only be “corroborated” by failures to 
falsify it). 
 81 Judge Kozinski’s ruling on remand in Daubert illustrates it nicely.  43 F.3d 1311, 
at 1320-22 (applying the reliability test in light of California law on sufficiency of the 
evidence); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 1073-74 (arguing that Daubert has 
contributed to the confusion in this regard); Berger, supra note 51, at 304-06 
(discussing rulings excluding expert testimony in toxic tort cases when based on 
studies showing a relative risk of less than 2); id. at 322-25 (discussing doctrinal 
aspects of a conflation of admissibility with sufficiency).  Certain statements in 
Daubert and Kumho Tire do encourage this.  See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153 
(apparently endorsing the trial court’s assessment that the challenged expert 
testimony “fell outside the range where experts might reasonably differ, and where 
the jury must decide among the conflicting views of different experts, even though 
the evidence is ‘shaky.’  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.”). 
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judgment.82  As Sam Gross has emphasized, it may well be important 
to facilitate explicit preemptive determinations on the merits by 
judges in cases for which the scientific evidence is overwhelmingly 
one-sided, but the entrenchment of a reliability-based admissibility 
regime is not the right way to achieve this goal.83  Here, as elsewhere, 
the distinction between admissibility and sufficiency should be kept 
clear in order to avoid confusion, mistaken rulings, and the improper 
use of precedents.84 
Deciding sufficiency in the guise of admissibility might or might 
not yield the same results that would occur if the admissibility and 
sufficiency determinations were kept properly distinct.  For example, 
in deciding whether to admit one expert opinion or set of opinions 
under such a sufficiency standard, if no other evidence favoring the 
proponent on the disputed fact is considered, such a procedure 
places an artificially high burden on the proffered expertise.  It is not 
clear what grounds can be offered for requiring that the expert 
testimony be enough by itself to sustain the burden.  Even if all other 
favorable expert evidence on that disputed fact is considered in 
making the sufficiency-imbued admissibility determination, the 
proponent may still be disadvantaged by not having the benefit of all 
non-expert evidence relating thereto.85 
Moreover, even if the trial court considers all evidence in the 
case on the material issue in question (including that which the 
 
 82 See Samuel R. Gross, Substance & Form in Scientific Evidence: What Daubert Didn’t 
Do, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 234, 246-48 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996).  “As 
the Bendectin cases illustrate, courts do not like to admit evidence and say it’s 
insufficient. Instead, they will go to unfortunate lengths to find that essential parts 
are inadmissible, and then say that there’s not enough left to go to the jury.”  Id. at 
252. 
 83 Id. at 255-61.  Gross identifies part of the problem as the conventional but 
poorly reasoned principle of the law of sufficiency that the opinion of any qualified 
expert is sufficient to sustain a verdict coinciding with the opinion.  This principle 
erroneously treats expert opinion as if it were just another form of direct evidence, 
whereas in fact it is a form of expert-assisted circumstantial inference.  Id. at 252-53. 
 84 See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447, 
449-59 (1990) (discussing confusion of admissibility with sufficiency that has helped 
to spawn the perverse doctrine of conditional relevance). 
 85 Replying to criticisms of the conflation of admissibility with sufficiency, 
Professor Mueller argues that there is nothing wrong with excluding evidence 
because it is insufficient to meet the burden of production, provided the proponent 
has an adequate opportunity to advise the court about all additional evidence that 
may be forthcoming on the issue.  Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right 
Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 987, 1001 (2003) (citing cases that illustrate such a practice).  This, of course, 
assumes that the court is willing to consider all such evidence, expert and non-
expert, in making its supposed admissibility ruling. 
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proponent is yet to introduce), the reliability requirement still 
amounts to the multiplication of events that trigger a summary 
determination, unless the admissibility of all the proponent’s 
expertise is decided in a single pre-trial hearing.  Otherwise, with 
each item of expertise offered on the issue by a party bearing the 
burden of production, the opponent gets, in effect, an opportunity to 
move for summary judgment.  With more bites at the apple, so to 
speak, such a procedure entails more cumulative probability of 
summary determination, as well as more expense incurred by a 
proponent who, in some cases, will be at a sizeable resource 
disadvantage.  It is unclear whether effectively increasing the burden 
of production is an intended or appropriate consequence, but no 
justification for doing so only in the presence of expert testimony has 
been provided.86 
Finally, the reliability requirement must be applied to parties not 
bearing a burden of production; Rule 702 does not distinguish on 
this ground.  The obvious example is expertise offered by a criminal 
defendant to negate the prosecution’s affirmative case.  If, however, 
the same methodology is applied by analogy to such parties, then 
their evidence may be subjected to artificially high admissibility 
hurdles.  Why, that is, should relevant expert testimony, unlike other 
evidence offered by an accused, be excluded simply because it is not 
enough to raise a reasonable doubt?  Worse yet, why should it be 
excluded just because similar evidence was not enough to warrant a 
finding by a preponderance of the evidence in some civil case that is 
cited by analogy, or because it was not enough to warrant a finding 
beyond reasonable doubt when offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal precedent?  This can be expected once these precedents are 
transmuted from sufficiency rulings into admissibility rulings. 
Even worse possibilities exist.  In their search for a manageable 
dichotomy to substitute for a determination of sufficient reliability, 
courts may try instead to determine which expert’s testimony on a 
particular matter, the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s, is based on more 
reliable information, excluding the loser in this comparative 
 
 86 In addition, sufficiency rulings are subject to de novo appellate review, while 
many admissibility rulings—including reliability determinations under Daubert—are 
subject to review only for abuse of discretion.  See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.6 
(arguing, however, that some reliability related issues should be considered de novo).  
Burying a sufficiency ruling within an admissibility ruling may thus have the effect of 
insulating the former from proper appellate review.  Cf. John J. Gibbons, Tenth 
Anniversary of the Supreme Court’s Decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 127 (2003) (discussing confusion in the review of admissibility rulings when 
they are part of a summary or directed judgment). 
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evaluation.87  Such a decision starts with a gradational conception of 
reliability but then transposes it into a binary one by way of the 
comparison.  It also amounts to a decision on the merits by the trial 
judge.88  The same is true if courts presume to think non-
comparatively by excluding alleged expertise that the court believes is 
simply incorrect, or if they try to decide which side should win and 
then admit or exclude evidence based on its propensity to produce 
the “right” result.  These various substitute decisions may be exactly 
what some interest groups would like to see by way of tort reform, but 
they are dangerous substitutions if the right to a jury trial is to be 
preserved, indeed if the right to a trial is to be preserved at all.89 
Reliability and Related Gradational Attributes.  Yet there is a germ of 
insight in such substitute approaches.  Many of the problems 
associated with a binary reliability regime can be avoided if we think 
in terms of comparative evaluation rather than isolated evaluation of 
reliability, provided the proper comparison is made.  As with the use of 
analogies in substantive law, one can sometimes answer the 
comparative question more easily or more coherently than the 
isolated one.90  Instead of asking whether a given item or type of 
proffered expertise is, relative to the suitably defined task at hand, 
reliable vel non (the isolated sense), or whether it is more reliable 
than that offered by the opponent (appropriately a question for the 
trier of fact), we might better ask whether a given item or type of 
proffered expertise is, in the context, more or less reliable than some 
 
 87 See Beecher-Monas, supra note footnote 38, at 1073 n.151 (asserting that this 
confusion may occur).  Once again, language can be found in Kumho Tire that would 
encourage this kind of thinking.  See 526 U.S. at 155 (comparing the challenged 
expert’s report on certain foundational facts, concerning the remaining tire tread, 
with testimony by opposing experts). 
 88 This possibility necessitated warnings from the drafters of the 2000 
amendment: “When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert’s 
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert 
testimony is unreliable.  The amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is 
the product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise.”  See 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 Amendments.  The drafters did 
not, however, go on to explain in what sense of “reliable” this idea can be 
maintained. 
 89 See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1047, 1057 (2003) (stating that “a fair definition . . . is that an item of evidence 
is reliable proof of a phenomenon if the existence of the evidence indicates a high 
probability that the phenomenon is true” and arguing that under such a conception 
of reliability, “[t]he whole notion of a trial, and indeed the whole purpose of the 
factfinder, falls away if we say that a given piece of evidence can be presented to the 
factfinder only if it is reliable”). 
 90 Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 92 (indicating the advantages of comparative 
veritistic evaluation of social practices). 
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alternative presentation by that party, including the possibility of 
simply dropping the challenged expertise from the evidentiary mix. 
To take advantage of the comparative evaluation of potential 
evidence packages, however, requires an acknowledgment of the 
different mode of thinking about reliability itself, for it depends, as 
already noted, on the ability to say that one package is more reliable or 
less reliable than another, which implicitly accepts that reliability is a 
matter of degree, like “probative value” and “credibility.”  In Part III, 
I will suggest ways to incorporate explicitly the gradational 
conception of reliability into the law of admissibility.  In so doing, I 
hope to further indicate that a gradational reliability concept is not 
only more appealing theoretically, but also more workable in 
practice. 
Before doing so, however, we should pause to note that the exact 
relationships among reliability, credibility, and probative value, as 
these terms are used in the federal rules, are unclear.  Common 
usage is vague, and the terms are not authoritatively defined.  For 
example, expert credibility might be viewed as simply part of what 
determines expert reliability, or credibility of the expert might be 
distinguished from the reliability of the expertise itself.91  The latter 
formulation would reserve credibility assessments for the trier of fact 
by limiting reliability assessment under Rule 702 to matters unrelated 
to witness credibility.  That might be desirable, but the oft-expressed 
concern about bias among experts suggests that the effects of bias 
must be taken into account in applying the reliability screening 
mandated by the rule.92 
Similarly, reliability might be considered one component of 
probative value, or the two might be considered distinct.  As a 
theoretical matter, it has been suggested that the probative value of 
an item of evidence be identified with its likelihood ratio relative to 
the contending hypotheses in the case.93  If so, then one might also 
 
 91 See, e.g., BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: 
EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 7-8 (1995) (noting that the term 
reliability is variously used to refer to test sensitivity, quality control, discriminatory 
power, or witness honesty). 
 92 Bias seems to be a major concern, for example, when courts making reliability 
assessments take into account whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters 
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of 
the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes 
of testifying.”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 93 In general terms, the likelihood ratio for evidence, E, is the probability that 
such evidence would be presented under the hypothesis of guilt (or liability), 
P(E|G), divided by the probability such evidence would be presented under the 
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identify reliability, or rather unreliability, as a measure of the extent 
to which evidence causes divergence between the subjective 
likelihood ratio of the trier of fact and (some measure of) the 
objective likelihood ratio that the trier ought to attribute to that 
evidence.94  The greater that divergence, the lower the reliability.95  
This suggestion seems to limit unreliability to a certain tendency to 
mislead.96  But this misses an important point: evidence that is not 
misleading at all, at least in the indicated sense, can nonetheless be 
considered to have weak reliability; it may have a degree of 
unreliability that is perfectly well understood by the decision maker 
and thus reflected in its assessment of probative value.  As I will argue 
below, focusing exclusively on the tendency to mislead the trier of 
fact, at least in the sense expressed in the suggested measure, gives 
the wrong focus to the reliability concern in the context of expert 
testimony. 
For the purpose of developing a workable interpretation of Rule 
702, therefore, it would be unwise to adopt a narrow and theoretically 
specific formalization of reliability.  Instead, we should work with its 
unrefined—but gradational—meaning, indicating a degree of 
dependability or trustworthiness.97  In comparative terms, one item of 
evidence is more reliable than another if the former is more 
dependable or trustworthy.98 
 
hypothesis of innocence (or non-liability), P(E|not-G).  It is a measure of the relative 
consistency of the evidence with the two contending hypotheses.  See Richard 
Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1023-24 (1977). 
 94 For an interesting analysis of the idea of “objective” likelihood ratios, see Alvin 
I Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 237 
(2002). 
 95 See REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 118-20 (building on the work of philosopher 
Alvin Goldman). 
 96 Redmayne discusses various problems with this model of reliability.  See id. at 
120-24. 
 97 Cf. id. at 118 (“I think the common use of the term does have a coherent, if 
unarticulated, meaning, which treats ‘reliable’ as a synonym of ‘dependable’ or 
‘trustworthy.’”). 
 98 Professor Imwinkelried, in his comment on a draft of this Essay, chides me for 
not providing a specific definition of reliability.  See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 
Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269, 282-83 (2003).  To be sure, I 
believe that my claim that the reliability concept in Rule 702 is better interpreted as 
gradational rather than as binary (which is not the same thing as saying that it should 
be understood as “relative” to the inferential task at hand, though this is also true, see 
id. at 285) can be demonstrated without providing a canonical definition of 
reliability.  Indeed, providing such a definition is not the role of someone offering an 
interpretation of an authoritative term.  Such definition must be given by the courts 
or by Congress.  In interpreting the rule, what commentators may do is to investigate 
or refine meaning, not to prescribe it. Nevertheless, in response to Imwinkelried’s 
understandable query, the best that I am currently able to do in this regard is to offer 
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III.  TOWARD A POLICY-BASED BALANCING FRAMEWORK 
In order to determine whether a differential in reliability 
warrants exclusion of the less reliable, it is crucial to look not only to 
the factors that affect the degree of reliability—factors that have been 
explored extensively in the extant literature—but also to the factors 
that would warrant the exclusion of relevant but insufficiently reliable 
evidence.  One commentator has written: 
[C]ourts and commentators have identified the varied 
considerations that determine the balance of probative value and 
prejudice of scientific evidence.  Applying these to various types of 
scientific evidence offers a more honest and sensitive basis for 
making admissibility decisions than the more cramped tests that 
have characterized this area of the law of evidence.99 
This assertion is, I think, largely correct, except that courts and 
commentators so far have done a much better job of identifying “the 
varied considerations that determine . . . probative value” than of 
examining the factors related to “prejudice” that would inform the 
indicated balance.  The latter is a major source of our continuing 
problems in understanding the reliability requirement.  How then 
shall we complete the analysis in such a way as to give due respect to 
the teachings of the Supreme Court and the mandate of Congress in 
amended Rule 702? 
Avoiding Blind Alleys.  Start by noting what should not be done.  It 
does not help, and it might hurt, to invoke the notion of a “threshold 
of reliability,” above which expertise is considered acceptable in court 
and below which it is not.  Unfortunately, prominent scholars—even 
some who disagree significantly about other aspects of expert 
testimony—often agree, explicitly or implicitly, that the post-Daubert 
regime rightly requires expertise to exceed such a threshold of 
 
the following comparative conception as an interpretation of what I think lawmakers 
might be groping toward: E1 is more reliable than E2, as evidence regarding 
proposition X, if and only if, without regard to whether either item of evidence 
favors X or not-X, but assuming (even if it is not true) that one favors X while the 
other favors not-X, a rational person required to wager on the truth of the 
proposition favored by E1 or that favored by E2 would bet on that which is favored by 
E1.  The hypothetical veil of ignorance—deciding which evidence is worth the bet 
without regard to which side of the dispute it favors—represents the core of good 
sense of the statement in Daubert that “the focus, of course, must be solely on 
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”  509 U.S. at 
595.  I cannot say that anything in my argument in the text depends on the precise 
terms of this definition, but it may give the reader a better idea of what I have in 
mind.  Or not.  Professor Imwinkelried’s call for a definition may actually have been 
intended as a call for a formula with which to compute a real-valued measure of 
reliability.  Obviously, I make no attempt to provide such a formula. 
 99 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, at 737 (footnote omitted). 
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reliability.100  Of course, if this mode of expression is understood 
simply as a metaphor for the use of another analytical framework, 
such as that of Rule 403, then it poses little danger, provided that 
framework is clearly identified.101  Yet, there are reasons to be 
skeptical of its employment even as metaphor. 
One serious problem with this method of transforming 
continuous variation into dichotomous choice is that it suggests, 
although it does not explicitly require, an invariant threshold that 
applies across disciplines and across litigation contexts.  The mental 
picture is an ascending scale of reliability with a mark that separates 
the insufficiently reliable from the sufficiently reliable.  The 
suggestion is that the location of this mark on the scale, as 
distinguished from the question of whether the particular evidence 
exceeds the threshold it indicates, is identifiable, at least in principle, 
without an appreciation of either the nature and type of expertise or 
the alternatives to it that may exist in the context of a particular case.  
This pernicious idea is essentially a resurrection, in the limited 
context of expert testimony, of the now-discredited “plus-value” 
requirement that Wigmore described for all evidence.102  The idea is 
misleading in that it suggests that expertise can be determined to be 
“sufficiently reliable” by considering only the degree of reliability, 
without considering the particular counterweights that cut against 
admission in context. 
Indeed, even without the imagery of the uniform minimum that 
 
 100 Compare, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 77, at 42-45 (not explicitly using the 
“threshold” terminology, but arguing that “when the question posed is the 
sufficiency of a foundation [for an expert opinion], the issue is whether the 
foundation is adequate to support the specific opinion proffered, not whether the 
expert has relied on the best scientific technique available”), with David L. Faigman, 
et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 645, 659, 664-65 (2000) (arguing for the use of a “better evidence” 
principle, but acknowledging the idea that the post-Daubert regime requires “a 
minimal threshold of reliability”). 
 101 Professor Faigman, in his comment on this paper, disclaims any suggestion 
that the idea of a “minimum threshold of reliability” can suffice to do the work of 
mapping gradational reliability into the dichotomous decision on admissibility, but 
he nonetheless argues that Daubert requires “some minimal amount of testing.”  The 
only explanation that he provides for this, however, involves an example (prediction 
by “tarot cards, tea leaves and crystal balls”) that surely would result in exclusion 
under Rule 403 without any help from Rule 702.  See Faigman, supra note 68, at 259.  
Perhaps, then, the invocation of a “minimum threshold” by Faigman et al., supra 
note 100, is really just an assertion that Rule 403 excludes purported expertise that is 
so weakly probative as to be a waste of time.  If so, I would agree, but that does not 
speak to the interpretation of Rule 702. 
 102 See 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 28 (Tillers rev. 
1983). 
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makes the threshold imagery appealing, it remains vacuous.  It 
merely restates the “sufficient reliability” idea without telling us 
anything affirmative about how to fill it out. Without more, one is left 
to suppose that the significance of the (unidentified) counterweights 
can be assessed by macroscopic gestalt, rather like identifying 
pornography by the “I know it when I see it” test.103  The same would 
be true of unadorned exhortations to admit only that which is 
“reasonably reliable,” although this locution is less likely to call for 
the invisible marker imagery.  Without giving attention to the 
parameters in the balance that determine whether a given degree of 
reliability is reasonable for admission, any such formulation 
effectively requires the judge to answer the question: “Does the 
degree of reliability of the expertise outweigh?”  Unless something 
follows the word “outweigh,” the question is practically incoherent.  
Outweigh what? 
Michael Graham’s interesting attempt to resolve the reliability 
puzzle is instructive in this regard.104  Professor Graham identifies two 
interpretations of the reliability requirement that struggle for 
recognition in the courts and that illustrate dichotomous and 
gradational conceptions of reliability, although he does not use this 
terminology.105  The first interpretation would require trial courts to 
determine “whether the [expert’s] explanative theory . . . produces a 
correct, accurate, truthful, valid conclusion.”106  Under the second 
interpretation, trial courts would determine “whether there are 
sufficient assurances present . . . that the expert witness’s explanative 
theory produces an accurate result to warrant jury acceptance.”107  
The first interpretation, which Graham rightly rejects as too 
demanding of experts and of courts,108 instantiates the dichotomous 
approach.  Graham argues for the second interpretation as more 
within judicial capacities and better suited to the “‘liberal thrust’ to 
admissibility of expert witness testimony that was favored by 
Daubert.”109  In doing so, he sometimes explicitly uses language that 
 
 103 The quote is from Justice Stewart’s famous concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 104 See Michael Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining “Reliable” Under 
the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000). 
 105 Id. at 336-39. 
 106 Id. at 317. 
 107 Id. at 317, 339. 
 108 Id. at 356. 
 109 Id. at 356-57. 
  
2003 ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERTS 223 
accepts the gradational nature of reliability.110 
Now, to ask whether there are sufficient assurances of accuracy 
to warrant jury acceptance (rather than jury consideration) of the 
expert’s opinion or information appears on its face to fall into the 
trap already noted of conflating admissibility with sufficiency.111  But 
the matter becomes less clear once one examines the details of such a 
determination as conceived by Graham.  An expert’s testimony would 
pass his test if either the expert’s theory “has gained widespread 
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs,”112 or (if neither 
widely accepted nor widely rejected113) it “possesses particularized 
earmarks of trustworthiness.”114  The first prong of this test seems to 
resurrect, modify, and extend the applicability of Frye, which may or 
may not be a good idea.115  However that may be, the idea of 
demanding, in default of such widespread consensus, only 
“particularized earmarks of trustworthiness” is as incomplete here as 
it is in the law of hearsay and confrontation, from which it is 
presumably drawn.116  If not understood as simply instrumentally 
related to a sufficiency ruling on the merits, itself problematic once 
again, this idea is just another way of articulating the essentially 
vacuous notion of a “threshold of reliability.”  And the problem 
remains: expertise cannot be known to pass a threshold—from 
insufficiently reliable to sufficiently reliable—just by identifying 
particularized earmarks of trustworthiness, no matter what they are 
or how many of them are accumulated.  Something is necessarily 
missing from such an analysis; one must know, in some sense, where 
the threshold is in order to know whether it has been passed.  Few 
would doubt the relevance of some such earmarks—presumably 
along the lines of the Daubert opinion and subsequent elaborations 
 
 110 E.g., Graham, supra note 104 , at 341 n.62. 
 111 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
 112 Graham, supra note 104, at 340. 
 113 Id. at 346. 
 114 Id. at 340. 
 115 Graham acknowledges that “reliance on ‘widespread acceptance’ is subject to 
the limitation that the entire field to which the explanative theory belongs does not 
itself simply ‘lack[ ] reliability’.”  Id. n.61.  This suggests that the widespread 
acceptance idea is instrumentally related to, and therefore subject to being trumped 
by, other considerations in regard to what is ultimately a sufficiency determination. 
 116 The idea of looking for particular indications of “trustworthiness”—Justice 
Blackmun’s synonym of choice for reliability (see supra note 7 and accompanying 
text)—is also prominent in the law of hearsay and the prevailing 
constitutionalization of hearsay in the confrontation clause.  On the inadequacy of 
this lore, see Richard D. Friedman, Truth and its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and 
Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1999).  See also Richard D. Friedman, 
Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998). 
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thereof—in the assessment of reliability, but once again that 
assessment constitutes only one side of the balance that needs to be 
considered in order to make an appropriate admissibility decision. 
The blind alley into which conventional analysis has wandered is 
nicely illustrated by a treatise statement made in the context of 
discussing the role of Rule 403 in screening expert testimony for 
reliability: 
Under Rules 702 and 104(a), judges must decide whether the 
proponent of scientific evidence has demonstrated the validity of 
the scientific basis for the testimony by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  In many cases, however, while judges might find 
scientific evidence to be “valid,” they might believe that it is not 
valid enough, in light of the dangers associated with its use.117 
I do not take issue with this statement as a description of prevailing 
conceptions.  My problem concerns those conceptions.  While it is 
certainly true that Rule 403 serves as a residual exclusionary principle 
that is analytically distinct from Rule 702, the point of the discussion 
in Part II is that conventional understandings of Rule 702 do not 
allow for any usable, non-balancing, rule-like criterion to which Rule 
403 can serve in such a capacity.  Consequently, it makes no sense to 
say that the validity determination can be meaningfully separated 
from a consideration of the “dangers associated with [the evidence’s] 
use.”  Once again, the binary conception of reliability suggested by 
the reference to a demonstration of validity “by a preponderance of 
the evidence” tends to conceal this problem. 
Connecting Reliability to Counterweights.  How, then, can we 
articulate a more coherent balancing analysis that gives explicit 
attention to the counterweights?  In fact, we can draw on a rich body 
of theory about the rationale of admissibility rules, for many such 
rules attempt to answer, in particular contexts, whether evidence of a 
certain type is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.118  As I have 
detailed elsewhere, these rules respond to one or more of three basic 
concerns: (1) that the trier of fact is prone to err in its assessment of 
the probative value of certain types of evidence or in its application of 
the burden of persuasion when faced with such evidence (concerns 
that are expressed primarily in regard to jury trials); (2) that the 
offered item of evidence will be of too little probative value to 
warrant the necessary expenditure of time and resources, including 
 
 117 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.8, at 59-60. 
 118 A similar strategy is employed, to somewhat different effect, in REDMAYNE, supra 
note 5.  Redmayne argues that “it is inconsistent for the English legal system to apply 
reliability-based exclusionary rules to hearsay and confession evidence, while not 
applying one to expert evidence.”  Id. at 126. 
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the cognitive resources of the trier of fact, necessary to incorporate it 
into the decision-making process (generally of concern in both jury 
and bench trials); and (3) that the trier of fact (judge or jury) should 
not be forced to assess the case based on the offered evidence when 
superior evidence is likely to be available.119 
The first two concerns lead to an admissibility structure that 
prefers the exclusion of the challenged evidence ceteris paribus, that is, 
all other evidence in the case being (hypothetically) the same.  They 
differ in that the first entails a much larger degree of epistemic 
paternalism than the second.  The third concern, however, leads to 
an exclusionary structure that prefers the replacement of the offered 
evidence with something else, better evidence.  It reflects more the 
problem of advocate control than the problem of jury control that tends 
to animate the first concern.  Jury credulity, after all, is not the only 
potential source of inaccuracy in adjudication.  Even in a bench trial, 
the court will want the best evidence reasonably available.120  Indeed, 
even in a trial by a panel of experts, were one to be undertaken, the 
panel would want such evidence.121 
Assuming that we are to deploy a sensitivity to these traditional 
concerns to interpret a “sufficient reliability” requirement, is there 
anything general and affirmative that one can say about how such an 
analysis should proceed?  A few parameters frame the discussion to 
come.  We are looking for an analysis that assumes testimony by a 
qualified expert that is relevant to a disputed issue and specifies an 
additional requirement related to reliability.  The strategy is to 
develop the implications of a gradational reliability concept in the 
context of each of the three concerns articulated above.  We want a 
standard, or set of standards, that is responsive to the concerns 
 
 119 See Nance, supra note 11, at 1554-60.  The analysis sets aside rules, such as those 
privileging certain confidential communications against disclosure, that rest largely 
on non-veritistic concerns relating to incentives for conduct, or the protection of 
relationships, outside the courtroom. 
 120 Id.  In a series of articles, I have argued at length that the third concern is 
more pronounced in the legitimate rationales of admissibility rules than 
conventionally thought.  See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995); Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, supra note 84; 
Dale A. Nance, Understanding Responses to Hearsay: An Extension of the Comparative 
Analysis, 76 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1992).  The most general treatment is Dale A. Nance, 
The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988) [hereinafter The Best Evidence 
Principle]. 
 121 Of course, a trier of fact can try to make allowances for the absence of 
evidence, but this is a second best solution as compared to having the better 
evidence before the tribunal.  See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden 
of Proof, 49 HASTINGS. L.J. 621, 633-39 (1998) (examining reasons not to rely upon 
jury discounting to handle problems of evidential incompleteness). 
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articulated above but not simply redundant of Rule 403.122  This 
presupposes that the Supreme Court did not simply intend to deliver 
the message that trial courts have been improperly applying Rule 403 
in the context of expert testimony.  More importantly, it reflects the 
general consensus that Daubert did not adopt the position advanced 
most conspicuously by Dean McCormick, well before the adoption of 
the federal rules, that would treat relevant testimony by a qualified 
expert in a way no different from most other kinds of evidence the 
admissibility of which is challenged, subjecting it to the standard 
balancing of probative value against competing concerns now 
reflected in Rule 403.123 
Nevertheless, because all three types of concerns identified 
above can be addressed by an analysis under Rule 403, and because 
analysis under that rule is at least reasonably well understood, it is 
possible to use that rule as a starting point in developing the kind of 
analysis needed for Rule 702.  Indeed, one norm clearly serves to 
distinguish the contemplated balancing test under Rule 702 from 
balancing under Rule 403.  Under 403, the burden is on the 
objecting party to convince the trial judge that the testimony’s 
probative value is outweighed by the indicated risks.124  In contrast, it 
is generally agreed that the burden is on the proponent of expertise 
 
 122 A familiar principle of statutory construction is that a body of rules should be 
interpreted so as not to render any one thereof wholly redundant of the others and 
therefore pointless.  See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000). 
 123 For McCormick’s view, see CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 363 (1954), in which McCormick criticized Frye as more appropriately a test 
for taking judicial notice.  He wrote, “Any relevant conclusions which are supported 
by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for 
exclusion.  Particularly, its probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers 
of prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair surprise and undue consumption of 
time.”  Id. at 363-64.  On Daubert’s rejection of the McCormick view, see Paul C. 
Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 
2009-12 (1994), explaining that Daubert is more demanding than the standard Rule 
403 analysis.  See also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 203 (comparing Frye 
and Daubert with McCormick’s preferred standard). 
 124 Nominally, Rule 403 authorizes exclusion only when probative value is 
“substantially outweighed” by one of the indicated concerns.  This presents a puzzle: 
How can it be that we should refrain from excluding evidence the probative value of 
which is outweighed by a concern, but not substantially outweighed by it?  If the probative 
value is outweighed by the concern, then the evidence should be excluded, should it 
not?  What else could it mean to say that it is “outweighed”?  This puzzle afflicts all 
Rule 403 jurisprudence, and the answer must be this: “substantially outweighed” is a 
sloppy locution intended to mean “clearly outweighed,” so that doubts about the 
balance of probative value and counterweights are resolved in favor of the 
proponent.  This seems to be how courts interpret the rule.  See CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.9, at 190 (2d ed. 1999). 
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to establish (sufficient) reliability under 702.125  One might leave it at 
that, switching the allocation of the burden but otherwise 
understanding the 702 reliability decision as a replication of the 403 
balancing test.126  That approach would certainly simplify the problem 
of articulating a coherent reliability test under Rule 702.127  For 
reasons explained below, however, I believe it is less than optimal. 
Offsetting Jury Credulity.  Both before and after Daubert, what has 
often been stated as the primary concern warranting the exclusion of 
proffered expertise of dubious reliability is the idea that a lay jury will 
be misled by such evidence, giving it greater credence than it 
deserves.128  This might seem to follow from one of the defining 
characteristics of expertise, that jurors lack specialized information 
available to the expert.  It coheres with suspicions about the 
credibility of experts for hire, if it is thought that jurors are unable to 
discount for the effects of bias.  As is well known, Daubert itself was 
decided within a climate of concern over jury credulity in the face of 
junk science.129 
This view of the matter has led to perceptive criticisms of the 
Court’s solution to the problem.  For example, Susan Haack poses 
the troubling rhetorical question: “[I]f judges need to act as 
gatekeepers to exclude scientific evidence which doesn’t meet 
minimal standards of warrant because juries may be taken in by flimsy 
scientific evidence, how realistic is it to expect juries to discriminate 
the better from the worse among the half-way decent?”130  Such 
criticisms carry undeniable force if juror credulity is the source of the 
 
 125 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.1.2. 
 126 This is the solution favored by my colleague, Calvin Sharpe, in his comment on 
this Essay.  See Calvin W. Sharpe, Reliability Under Rule 702: A Specialized Application of 
403, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 289, 307 (2003). 
 127 This approach would provide something resembling a “minimum threshold of 
reliability” at least theoretically distinguishable from Rule 403.  See supra note 101.  
Unlike the abstract use of that phrase, however, the present suggestion (a) identifies 
the counterweights that are to be assessed in context, and (b) requires a weighing of 
the probative value of the evidence, as affected by the degree of its reliability, against 
the identified counterweights. 
 128 Pre-Daubert: see, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide 
Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984); Moenssens, supra note 27, at 564-67.  Post-Daubert: 
see, e.g., Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 53, at 974; Graham, supra note 104, at 356; 
Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1875, 1878-79 (1994). 
 129 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 
(1991). 
 130 Haack, supra note 80, at 233. 
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Court’s concern.131 
Strikingly, however, the majority opinion in Daubert was at pains 
to disavow any serious skepticism about jury competence, opining 
that it is “overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury” to think 
that abandonment of Frye’s general acceptance test would result in 
litigation “in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and 
irrational pseudoscientific assertions.”132  Although the Court was 
anything but clear about why a reliability inquiry is needed, other 
than to say that—needed or not—it is somehow mandated by the 
language of Rule 702 (which at the time contained no explicit 
reference to reliability), the Court seemed fairly clear in 
distinguishing jury credulity as a source of its concerns.133  Neither the 
opinion in Kumho Tire, nor the advisory committee’s explanation of 
the 2000 amendment speaks to the contrary.134 
In this, the law’s promulgators were right.  The available 
empirical evidence points to jurors being remarkably conscientious in 
their work and not demonstrably less accurate in their inferences 
than judges.135  More specifically, so far we have no empirical basis to 
conclude that jury credulity in over-crediting expert testimony is a 
serious or pervasive problem.  After a careful review of the available 
studies, Neil Vidmar and Shari Diamond recently concluded simply: 
“Empirical data do not support a view that juries are passive, too-
credulous, incompetent, and overawed by the mystique of the 
expert.”136 
 
 131 See also Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate 
About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror “Incompetence” and Scientific 
“Objectivity,”  25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086-93 (1993) (maintaining that arguments 
against juror competence are often intuitively implausible or logically inconsistent). 
 132 Daubert, 509 U.S. 595-96 (expressing confidence in the adversary system’s 
ability to handle this sort of problem in most cases). 
 133 See Andrew Taslitz, Daubert’s Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Not-So-Plain-
Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 3, 62-65 (1995). 
 134 One can try to dig further.  For example, in an earlier constitutional case, not 
involving the interpretation of Rule 702, Justice Blackmun, the author of the 
majority opinion in Daubert, made a statement that suggests a concern about jury 
credulity.  See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an 
impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words, 
equates with death itself.”).  But is hard to know how seriously to weight such a 
statement as a proposition warranting the reliability requirement in Daubert.  In any 
event, we need not base interpretation of amended Rule 702 on undisclosed 
concerns of the judges in Daubert. 
 135 See generally JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & 
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
 136 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1121, 1180 (2001); see also REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 107, 109-12 (reviewing the 
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Ironically, if there is distortion in jurors’ evaluation of expertise, 
extant empirical studies suggest that the problem is likely to be the 
opposite of what is usually assumed.  It appears that jurors sometimes 
undervalue complex expert testimony of relatively high probative 
value, especially when its significance for the disputed issues is not 
well explained.137  Based on such results, one might argue that the 
reason to exclude expertise of poor reliability is not because it will be 
overvalued, but rather because contrary expertise of much greater 
reliability offered by the opponent will be undervalued, leading to an 
inaccurate weighing of the opposing proofs.  The problems with such 
an argument, however, are pretty clear: it conflates admissibility with 
sufficiency and distorts the latter.  It attempts to deal with a 
sufficiency problem—that jurors might improperly weigh competing 
evidence—by excluding evidence that is not itself subject to 
demonstrated overvaluation.  And it prevents the jury from 
combining the evidence of low reliability with independent evidence, 
if there is any, that might be enough in combination rationally to 
convince the jury.  The better response to the indicated problem, 
when it occurs, is to explore ways to reduce the jurors’ 
undervaluation of the superior expertise by improving their 
comprehension of its significance.138 
The foregoing observations are consistent with, but do not 
entail, the more general proposition that juries have greater difficulty 
as the scientific or technical complexity of the evidence increases.  
There is some limited evidence to support such a general 
proposition, although the evidence is subject to various 
interpretations.139  To be sure, the idea is not particularly surprising, 
 
empirical studies and concluding that “the focus on jury competence is somewhat 
misplaced”); Jacobs, supra note 131, at 1094-98 (arguing that doubts about juror 
competence with respect to scientific evidence fail to take into account the growing 
body of empirical evidence to the contrary). 
 137 See, e.g., Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation 
Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match 
Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002) (confirming with summoned jurors the 
results of earlier research conducted mostly with students: while a few jurors seem to 
make identifiable mistakes that might lead them to overvalue scientific “trace” 
evidence with a quantifiable random match probability, the greatly predominant 
problem seems rather to be that juries excessively discount the probative value of such 
evidence). 
 138 See, e.g., id. (finding that variation in the manner of presenting the random 
match probability affects the extent of jury undervaluation of trace evidence relative 
to Bayesian norms). 
 139 See, e.g.,  Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After 
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181-247 (Robert E. Litan 
ed., 1993) (reviewing the available evidence and concluding (at p. 235) that “the 
weight of the evidence indicates that juries can reach rationally defensible verdicts in 
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for it is difficult to imagine a plausible definition or criterion of 
“complexity” that would not render the proposition true to some 
degree, if not tautologically so.  Almost by definition, complex cases 
are difficult cases. Consequently, an analogous proposition will be 
true for any decision makers, including judges or panels of experts.  
And even if judges’ veritistic acumen falls off less steeply than juries’ 
as complexity increases—which we cannot as yet conclude—that 
would seem to speak to the question of the wisdom of jury trials in 
complex cases, not to the question of the advisability or criterion of 
excluding evidence.140 
In his present contribution Joseph Sanders tries to bridge this 
gap, developing the best argument yet identified for grounding the 
Rule 702 reliability determination in epistemic paternalism toward 
the jury.141  Building on the slender reed of the jury’s asserted 
difficulties in complex cases, he concludes that “on balance the 
empirical research does lend some support to the paternalistic 
justification for restrictions on the admissibility of unreliable expert 
testimony.”142  As I understand his argument, however, the most that 
can be inferred from the available data is that, if judges are capable of 
making the necessary discriminations (which we do not know), then 
“close scrutiny of testimony [by judges] is potentially most beneficial 
in complex cases where peripheral processing [by jurors] is most 
likely.”143  And Sanders acknowledges that we do not have evidence 
from which to conclude that judges are capable of identifying 
evidence that is “unreliable” relative to the goal of minimizing 
erroneous verdicts (or the costs thereof) due to either (a) jury 
misunderstanding of admitted expertise or (b) jury error induced by 
exclusions.144 
 
complex cases”); cf. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 193 (“If there is one lesson to be drawn 
from these cases, one single overarching problem revealed by the Bendectin 
litigation, it is that in cases involving complex scientific evidence juries have a 
difficult time reaching the truth.”). 
 140 Even with regard to the choice between bench trial and jury trial, such a 
showing would be incomplete.  If, for example, juries are much better than judges in 
relatively uncomplicated cases, then juries’ reduced acumen in complex cases might 
still be higher than judges’.  See LEMPERT, supra note 139, at 234-35 (concluding that 
there is still no evidence that judges will perform better than juries in complex 
cases). 
 141 See Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003). 
 142 Id. at 938. 
 143 Id. at 937.  “Peripheral processing” refers to the jury’s use of factors such as 
credibility cues as opposed to an assessment of the rational strength of the inference 
suggested by the expert.  Id. at 909. 
 144 Id. at 937-38. 
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This valiant effort, therefore, does not close the argumentative 
gap.  Because the evidence does not show whether such judicial 
scrutiny is on balance beneficial or harmful, even in complex cases, 
the claim that judicial scrutiny is “potentially most beneficial” in 
certain cases is the same as saying that it is “potentially least harmful” 
in such cases.  In other words, at best Sanders has shown that if 
judges are successfully trained to make good assessments of the 
degree of reliability and exclude expertise on paternalistic grounds 
when they think the evidence has low reliability (a big “if”), then the 
expected benefit of such a practice increases as the degree of 
complexity of the case increases, but the expected benefit (for all we 
know) might not be positive over any identifiable range of complexity.  
Thus, the argument necessarily falls short of a justification for a 
reliability-based exclusionary practice applied in all cases involving 
expert testimony. 
Until we have more evidence of jury credulity, as well as more 
evidence that judges are in fact capable of offsetting such 
incompetence by their decisions to exclude expertise, respect for the 
political significance of the jury and for those citizens who are called 
to service on juries dictates that we should not readily exclude 
supposed expertise on this ground.  Instead, we should leave this kind 
of problem to be handled under the pro-admissibility standard 
articulated in Rule 403, as in fact prescribed by the majority in 
Daubert.145  Indeed, before excluding evidence on this ground, courts 
should at least consider and rule out less drastic remedies such as 
judicial comment on the evidence.146 
Monitoring Adversarial Presentations.  Much more prominent in 
the Daubert and Kumho Tire opinions is a concern about regulating 
the introduction of expert testimony so that it will properly assist the 
trier of fact.147  The question is how excluding proffered expert 
testimony can be of assistance, if the concern is not about juror 
credulity.  Obviously, expertise that is very unreliable may be 
excluded under Rule 403 as simply a waste of time.  This is not an 
insignificant limitation on the use of experts, given the far-fetched 
proffers that occasionally find their way into courtrooms.  But the 
 
 145 509 U.S. at 595; see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746-47 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (per Becker, J.) (accepting that Daubert altered prior law in the circuit by 
taking consideration of the danger of overwhelming or confusing the jury out of the 
Rule 702 analysis and committing it to the Rule 403 analysis); FOSTER & HUBER, supra 
note 38, at 207-09 (noting that Rule 403 is the appropriate tool for dealing with 
problems of jury credulity). 
 146 See Friedman, supra note 89, at 1064. 
 147 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149, 156; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 592, 593. 
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question here is whether we can go further to find exclusionary 
principles that are more demanding than this obvious time-saving 
norm.148  What is there in expert testimony that might call for such a 
heightened burden? 
I am inclined to believe that the answer lies in the greater 
manipulability of such evidence, as compared to most non-expert 
testimony.  The supply of non-expert testimony, limited as it is by the 
requirement of first-hand or “personal” knowledge,149 tends to be 
fixed by the litigated events.  Typically, only a small number of 
persons will have witnessed the events being litigated.  For practical 
purposes, expert testimony knows no such limitation.  When a matter 
is thought by counsel to be amenable to expert assistance, there are 
often numerous specializations and hundreds or thousands of 
practitioners thereof who might be called to testify.  Data can often 
be gathered and experiments can sometimes be conducted in 
anticipation of trial.  Put simply, expert testimony is produced in a way 
that most non-expert testimony is not, coaching of lay witnesses 
notwithstanding.150  And there are obvious and powerful distorting 
and biasing forces at work in this production process, much of which 
occurs after the events being litigated and with an eye toward trial.151 
The implication is that greater judicial management or 
monitoring of evidence might be needed in this context in order to 
prevent adversarial incentives from undermining the accuracy of 
trials.  To be clear, this implication derives not so much from a 
concern that jurors cannot or do not rationally take these process 
considerations into account, but rather from the view that they 
should not be required to do so when a better alternative can be 
found.  The next two sections examine possible arguments for 
intervention in the adversarial exchange on reliability grounds, 
suggesting how such interventions might be structured to assist the 
 
 148 I put aside the intensely skeptical suggestion that would exclude all conflicting 
expert testimony before the trier of fact because neither a judge nor a jury has the 
background to decide between conflicting experts, a suggestion that can only be tied 
to some sort of court appointed expert system.  See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and 
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 51-56 (1901).  
The suggestion may have some merit, but it exceeds the scope of my present inquiry. 
 149 See FED R. EVID. 602, 701. 
 150 See RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1013-16 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 151 One need not embrace an extreme fact skepticism to see in these phenomena 
the ability to undermine verdict accuracy.  See REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 5-35 
(discussing “case construction” using forensic science in criminal cases).  To be sure, 
concerns about experts for hire being especially prone to distort their testimony are 
probably exaggerated, at least in civil cases, given the market mechanisms that will 
influence experts.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS IN LEGAL THEORY 401-04 (2001). 
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trier of fact. 
Marshaling Cognitive Resources.  One plausible line of argument 
begins with the idea of helping the trier of fact (whether judge or 
jury) to focus its attention—its cognitive resources—on the most 
reliable forms of expertise offered by each side on a disputed issue.  
When multiple proffers of expertise address a single issue, one tool to 
be considered is to remove from the trial the least reliable evidence 
offered by a party on that issue. 
Suppose, for example, that a party needs to prove the value of a 
vacant parcel of land.  The party offers several different forms of 
expertise that relate to the question.  One is a survey of prices at 
which twenty vacant parcels, of identified acreage, within a mile of 
the subject parcel were sold.  The opponent raises questions about 
the methodology of the survey.  The proponent also offers the 
testimony of three experienced realtors who have visited the subject 
parcel and made “gestalt” assessments based only on their visits (and 
their experience) and not, for example, on the information 
contained in the survey of prices.  Each “gestalt expert” places the 
per-acre value of the disputed land at a figure higher than the 
average per acre figure from the survey.  The opponent also raises 
questions about the reliability of such gestalt assessments.  In such a 
case, it would be plausible, depending on the details of the 
challenges raised, for a trial court to conclude that the survey of 
prices is substantially more reliable, as a measure of the value of the 
disputed parcel, than the gestalt testimony.  The court might then 
assist the trier of fact by excluding the latter, forcing the parties to 
focus, before the jury, on the details of the challenge to the reliability 
of the survey.152 
How would this be of assistance?  If we put aside the possibility of 
distortion due to jury credulity, why would not the jury always be 
better off with more relevant information rather than less, subject to 
the limits of cumulativeness?  It may be difficult for lawyers or 
experts, accustomed in their reflective moments to an all-things-
considered, use-every-piece-of-available-information type of decision 
 
 152 An alternative resolution might be to insist, as a condition of admissibility, that 
the “gestalt” witnesses make less subjective appraisals by incorporating the survey 
data in the basis of their opinions.  This kind of response is addressed in the 
following subsection.  Another possibility, of course, is that the gestalt witnesses 
might be considered to be so weakly reliable as to make consideration of them a 
waste of time and inadmissible under Rule 403.  It is, of course, difficult to come up 
with an example for which the application of Rule 403 is incontestable, so for present 
purposes, assume that the gestalt witnesses would not be properly excluded pursuant 
to Rule 403. 
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making, to accept the possibility that “less is more” in the adjudicative 
context.  Yet there are reasons to entertain the idea.  Decision theory 
has shown that sometimes basing decision on only selected features 
of a decision environment can be as successful or more successful, 
and less costly in time and other resources, than a more nuanced 
decision scheme that takes all pertinent factors into account.153  Even 
restricting consideration to a single factor can be remarkably 
accurate if that factor is the best single factor for the decision.154  
These findings present at least the possibility of a strategy that can 
generate improvements in the accuracy of verdicts as well as a 
reduction in the cost of trials.  Such a strategy would give concrete 
meaning to that portion of the Daubert opinion that rejects the need 
to have as complete and wide-ranging debate on the matters 
addressed in litigation as is needed in the scientific process.155 
Unfortunately, the efficacy of particular decision heuristics is 
context dependent.  To work well, a simple decision heuristic must 
take advantage of information structures in particular decision 
environments.156  At this point, we have no experiments or empirical 
studies that can establish how this plays out in the context of 
adversarial trials.  For the time being, therefore, a trial judge would 
best approach the problem by placing herself in the position of the 
jury and asking whether the challenged expertise is so unreliable, in 
comparison to other expertise offered by the same party, that the 
judge would ignore the challenged proffer if she were the trier of fact.  
This viewpoint takes advantage of any applicable decision heuristics 
 
 153 See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 
(1999). 
 154 Id. at 73-168 (discussing the “Take the Best” heuristic). 
 155 Justice Blackmun wrote: 
It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and 
scientific analyses.  Yet there are important differences between the 
quest of truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the 
laboratory.  Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.  
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.  The 
scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration 
of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually 
be shown to be so, and that in itself is  an advance.  Conjectures that 
are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching 
a quick, final, and binding judgment—often of great importance—
about a particular set of events in the past. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97. 
 156 The successfulness of a heuristic depends on its “ecological rationality,” the 
domain-specific match between the heuristic and the information environment in 
which it is employed.  See Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX  38, 46-48 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten 
eds., 2001). 
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available to the judge to economize cognitive resources.  In jury trials, 
it also helps to prevent slipping into a consideration of jury credulity, 
since it is unlikely that the judge will consider herself to be subject to 
irrational overvaluing of the challenged evidence.  This viewpoint is 
one of representation: The trial judge represents the jury, whose silence 
cannot operate to exclude evidence that its members would consider 
comparatively too unreliable to be of use.157 
Here, then, is one place where the stricter demands of Daubert, 
Kumho Tire, and Rule 702 might be put into effect.  As noted above, 
conventional wisdom is that the effect of these developments is to 
place the burden on the proponent to establish “reliability.”158  
Applying this idea here, if the trial judge concludes that the 
challenged expertise is discernibly less reliable than other expertise 
offered by the proponent, then the burden would rest on the 
proponent to convince the judge that it would be a mistake to ignore 
the challenged expertise because its consideration will materially 
assist the trier of fact to render an appropriate verdict within the 
constraints imposed by the process of trial.  Doubt on the matter 
would be resolved in favor of exclusion, reversing the burden as 
compared to Rule 403.159  Distinguishing this analysis from that of 
Rule 403 would help to maintain the representational viewpoint 
described earlier.160 
Despite this default principle favoring exclusion, an important 
limitation of the present analysis is that it presupposes there is 
expertise of discernibly superior reliability offered by the proponent 
of the challenged evidence. Sometimes no such judgment is possible.  
For example, returning to our land appraisal case, suppose the 
proponent’s experienced realtors base their otherwise gestalt 
appraisals on an unusual characteristic of the parcel not shared by 
the twenty parcels included in the survey of sale prices.  In such a 
 
 157 Cf. The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 120, at 291 (suggesting a broader use 
of the representative perspective). 
 158 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 159 This would reverse the argumentative burden only when items of expertise of 
significantly different reliability are involved.  If, for example, the opponent’s 
complaint is simply that too many witnesses are offered to testify to the same effect, 
then the burden would remain on the opponent, under Rule 403, to convince the 
judge that proffered witnesses would be cumulative. 
 160 To provide notice to the proponent and to sharpen the issues, the opponent 
should have the initial burden of providing a reason to think that the challenged 
expertise is less reliable than other expertise offered by the proponent on the point.  
But then the proponent would have to surmount the persuasive hurdle for the 
challenged expertise to be ruled not inadmissible on this ground.  Fed. R. Evid. 
104(a) would govern the determinations, as indicated in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
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case, a trial judge might properly conclude that both types of 
evidence should be considered by the trier of fact.  The important 
point, in any event, is that the assessment should proceed not in 
terms of whether a particular proffer is sufficiently reliable or 
reasonably reliable, considered by itself, but rather whether the 
proponent’s package of expertise on the issue is as reliable, and thus 
as helpful to the jury, as it might be if narrowed by the exclusion of 
some of what is offered.  The comparative nature of the evaluation is 
crucial.161 
There is a further implication, one that will not sit well with 
those who see in the reliability requirement a quick route to summary 
judgment.  If the challenged testimony is the only expertise offered by 
a party on the disputed fact, the judge would not be warranted in 
excluding it, at least not under the theory posited.  For example, in 
our hypothetical real estate appraisal case, if the proponent 
presented only the gestalt witnesses, they could not be excluded in 
the interest of marshaling cognitive resources.  The reason for this 
limitation is that the present rationale of exclusion is to assist the jury 
in focusing on the best expertise each party has on the issue.  With no 
other expertise on the proponent’s side, there is nothing presented 
with which to make a comparative reliability assessment except the 
expertise, if any, offered by the opponent.  To use that as the basis for 
comparison would be, for practical purposes, to address the merits of 
the case.  Consequently, if the party’s only expertise on the matter is 
to be excluded, it would have to be done on some other ground, such 
as to avoid mistakes due to jury credulity or to avoid wasting the jury’s 
time with very unreliable expertise—each of which would require 
meeting the more demanding (for the opponent) standard of Rule 
403—or to induce the proponent to present better expertise, about 
which more follows in the next section. 
It is important, therefore, not to overstate the impact of 
adopting the foregoing analysis as compared to a scheme that would 
dispose of a separate reliability inquiry under Rule 702 and leave such 
matters to be handled under Rule 403.  Obviously, some 
 
 161 The demands of this analysis may not be circumvented by a proponent’s 
gratuitous inclusion of extremely weak expertise that would otherwise not have been 
submitted, on the theory that its exclusion under the analysis suggested here would 
leave the proponent’s other evidence untouched.  That will not work, since the 
principle discussed in this section may be iterated; with the strategically inserted 
expertise out of the way, the court could proceed to test the proponent’s next 
weakest evidence as if the subterfuge had not taken place.  There would be, 
therefore, no incentive for a proponent to throw in sacrificial junk expertise, unless 
of course some judges systematically misapplied the principle suggested here. 
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comparatively unreliable expert testimony could and would be 
excluded under Rule 403 anyway.  Still, the suggested analysis might 
effectively, if marginally, narrow the scope of offered expertise in a 
way that would assist the trier of fact to focus on the best expert 
evidence offered by each side.  Whether the limited veritistic gain to 
be derived from such a marshaling of cognitive resources is worth the 
added complexity in the reliability inquiry is difficult to assess a priori.  
I have stated the case for such an exclusionary principle as well as I 
can.  Nevertheless, I am skeptical that this is the kind of reliability 
inquiry for which we are searching. 
My skepticism derives from three main considerations.  First, 
relying (as we must, for the time being) on the trial judge’s intuitions 
about what will facilitate cognitively economical decision-making 
might produce as much heuristic error as it does veritistic 
improvement.  Judges, after all, are not immune from cognitive 
illusions.162  There is, moreover, considerable controversy among 
those who study the accuracy of human decision-making about the 
usefulness of commonly employed decision heuristics.163  And, as 
noted above, none of the extant research speaks directly to the 
question of selection of evidence, expert or otherwise, in an 
adversarial trial setting where admissibility decisions are separated 
from evaluations of evidentiary weight.  Because heuristics can be 
relatively successful or not, depending on the particular decision 
environment, it is hard to say with any confidence that significant 
improvement will result from a practice in which judges exclude the 
least reliable expertise that a party offers. 
Relatedly, one might question whether it is necessary to exclude 
evidence to achieve the contemplated benefits, assuming they are 
non-trivial.  Will not the trier of fact employ its own heuristics, 
placing its serious attention on the subset of admitted expertise that 
will allow it to render a reasonably accurate and prompt verdict?164  
This is possible, and to the extent that it is true, the exclusion of 
 
 162 There is evidence, for example, that judges are subject to heuristic errors such 
as anchoring and hindsight bias.  See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (reporting the results of a study of 167 federal 
magistrate judges). 
 163 Compare Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (presenting a relatively pessimistic assessment), with 
GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 153 (presenting a more optimistic assessment). 
 164 The evidence that ordinary people actually employ particular “fast and frugal” 
heuristics that have been theoretically identified and tested is as yet sketchy.  Peter 
M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds, in BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY, supra note 156, at 63-67. 
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expertise serves primarily to streamline trials and potentially improve 
accuracy by saving the cognitive resources that would be devoted by 
the trier of fact to selecting those forms of expertise that should 
receive more detailed attention.  On the other hand, what is saved in 
terms of the jury’s time could be lost in terms of the judge’s time.165  
Perhaps future research will shed light on these matters in a way that 
will make the potential benefits less speculative. 
The third consideration relates to the workability of the 
exclusionary principle and arises primarily from the asymmetry that 
the proposed structure would put in place.  Suppose, for example, in 
our hypothetical property valuation case, that the plaintiff’s gestalt 
witnesses are excluded because she has presented more reliable 
survey evidence as well; the trial judge believes that the gestalt 
witnesses will only be distracting.  Suppose, then, that defendant 
offers its own gestalt witnesses as its only expertise on the issue.  As 
indicated above, the present principle of exclusion would not be 
available upon plaintiff’s objection, with the consequence that 
defendant would be able to introduce expertise with the same or a 
lesser degree of reliability as that which was foreclosed to the plaintiff 
upon defendant’s objection.  Many, including a party in the plaintiff’s 
situation, will consider this result unfair.  This sense of unfairness, to 
the extent that it is well-founded, will be largely attributable to 
concerns about the way that a jury will react to the situation.166  There 
is a danger that the jury will (rationally!) draw a negative inference 
from plaintiff’s failure to present counter evidence in the form of 
gestalt witnesses, or something similar thereto, witnesses who, by the 
trial court’s admission thereof, have been seemingly certified as 
reliable enough to warrant the jury’s consideration.167 
 
 165 As a further factor, it is possible that without judicial assistance in winnowing 
the evidence to be considered, the jury might feel obligated to neglect its own 
common sense in favor of a searching consideration of every item of evidence 
admitted, an effort that could be distracting.  But this remains highly conjectural. 
 166 In a bench trial, the plaintiff will have substantial solace in the fact that the 
trial judge has already gone on record in ruling survey evidence more reliable than 
gestalt witnesses. 
 167 Scholars have discussed the idea that jurors may be misled when they expect to 
receive evidence that a party has tried unsuccessfully to introduce.  See generally Bruce 
A. Green, “The Whole Truth?”: How the Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 699, 699-704 (1992); Stephen Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of 
Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. 
REV. 1011 (1978).  Empirical evidence confirms that negative inferences from 
missing evidence can occur.  See, e.g., Bettyruth Walter, The Civil Juror: A Research 
Project Sponsored by the Roscoe Pound Foundation, in GUINTHER, supra note 135, at 285, 
313; Tina M. Webster et al., Voices from an Empty Chair: The Missing Witness Inference 
and the Jury, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 39-41 (1991). 
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There are a number of possible solutions to this kind of 
problem, including informing the jury that the judge excluded some 
of plaintiff’s offered expertise and the reasons therefor, or allowing 
the plaintiff to use her gestalt witnesses in rebuttal once the 
defendant has “opened the door” to such.  But these solutions entail 
some extension of the jury’s consideration to the very evidence the 
exclusion of which was supposed to streamline the trial.  To be sure, 
this kind of problem will not arise in all cases affected by the 
exclusionary principle articulated,168 but its potential reduces the 
overall benefit to be derived by adding the complexity of a test based 
on marshaling of cognitive resources. 
For the time being, then, the most that Rule 702 should do, in 
the name of marshaling cognitive resources, is to reverse the burden 
of Rule 403 regarding whether a proponent’s evidence is sufficiently 
reliable as not to constitute a waste of the tribunal’s time and 
resources.  Upon objection, the proponent would be required to 
show that this balance clearly favors admission.  Even if a more 
discriminating exclusionary structure like that  discussed above is 
premature, the trial judge under this simpler framework might at 
least be sensitive to the importance that the judge as trier of fact 
would attribute to the various items of expertise offered by the same 
proponent and to any rational heuristics the judge would employ as 
trier of fact. 
This simplified structure, however, would pose greater risk of the 
exclusion of all of a party’s expertise, as its potential reach extends to 
even the party’s most reliable expertise.  This in turn presents again 
the risk of judicial misuse of Rule 702 to exclude expertise when, and 
just because, the opposing expertise is more reliable.  And it is 
problematic whether judges would be able to maintain the distinction 
between this analysis and the pro-admissibility standard that, I have 
argued, is appropriate when jury credulity is the expressed concern.  
It would be easy to slide from a consideration of what would be useful 
to the judge (and therefore to the jury) to what would be useful to the 
judge but not to the more gullible jury.  Consequently, while this 
framework might be workable, I remain skeptical.  I would rather 
leave the matter to the conventional Rule 403 analysis, with the 
burden of argument on the opponent of the expertise, until such 
time as a more discriminating framework becomes warranted by the 
empirical evidence. 
 
 168 The defendant in the example might not attempt to introduce pure gestalt 
witnesses, but might instead offer one or more witnesses whose expertise is not 
discernibly less reliable than the survey evidence admitted for the plaintiff. 
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Securing Better Evidence.  One exclusionary principle remains.  
Much more important in articulating a meaningful content for the 
reliability requirement of Rule 702, and more likely to result in the 
exclusion of proffered expertise, is the idea that evidence may be 
excluded to encourage the presentation of better evidence, evidence 
that is more probative or less costly for the tribunal, or otherwise 
presenting a more favorable balance between the two.  This idea is 
present in a wide variety of rules,169 including Rule 403.170  Here again, 
we may ask whether the “produced” nature of expert testimony 
requires that a heavier burden be placed on a proponent thereof 
than is imposed by Rule 403 in this and other contexts.  The post-
Daubert reliability requirement arguably entails an affirmative answer. 
An illustration can be found in the regulation of the use of 
pretrial experiments: 
In passing on the admissibility of pretrial experiments, courts 
often assert that the experiment must be “substantially similar” to 
the conditions of the litigated event.  However, what constitutes 
substantial similarity is all but impossible to discern from the case 
law without inquiring into the possibility that a better experiment 
could have been done.  The best explanation of the results in 
these cases seems to be that “whenever the marginal benefits of a 
more refined experiment do not exceed the marginal costs, and 
the experiment is probative, the substantial-similarity requirement 
should be deemed satisfied.”171 
Several distinguished scholars have recognized the pertinence of this 
kind of consideration in implementing the reliability requirement for 
expert testimony, emphasizing that courts need to be demanding 
consumers of expertise, especially those kinds of expertise that find 
their reason for existence in the demand for expert testimony.172  I 
 
 169 For example, secondary evidence of the contents of a document is excluded in 
preference for the original, FED. R. EVID. 1002.  For numerous other examples, see 
the articles cited supra note 120. 
 170 One factor a court should consider in deciding whether to exclude evidence 
challenged under Rule 403 is the “availability of other means of proof.”  FED. R. EVID. 
403 advisory committee’s note.  This is amply demonstrated by the decision in United 
States v. Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), holding that in some circumstances evidence 
of prior crimes offered by the government may be excluded in favor of a stipulation 
to the conviction when the stipulation involves no less legitimate probative value but 
less prejudicial potential than the proffered evidence. 
 171 Faigman et al., supra note 100, at 654 (footnotes omitted). 
 172 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.5.1.  The matter was debated in recent 
issues of the Case Western Reserve Law Review.  See Faigman et al., supra note 100; 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Final Comment—The Importance of the Procedural Framework, 
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669 (2000); Imwinkelried, supra note 77.  The important 
point to be derived from this exchange is that the better evidence idea need not be 
taken as entailing some strict hierarchy of types of evidence, whether expert or 
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would go further: this kind of consideration represents the primary, if 
not exclusive argument structure appropriate for the reliability 
inquiry of Rule 702.  For want of a better alternative structure, the 
principal question here is whether this consideration can be 
elaborated into a workable framework for decision.  In the following 
paragraphs, I briefly explore the parameters of such a framework. 
The most important consideration, once again, is the viewpoint 
to be adopted by the judge when making the decision.  The judge 
should ask whether a reasonable jury, sensitive to the delays and costs 
associated with a demand for more reliable expertise, would express 
such a preference.  Once again, the judge acts to facilitate good 
inferences by speaking on behalf of the silent jury, not to channel the 
jury’s inferences out of suspicion of jury credulity.  On behalf of the 
jury, the judge will want the best evidence that is or should have been 
reasonably available, with due regard to the adversarial structure of 
the trial, in knowledge of which the trial judge has a distinct 
comparative advantage relative to the jury.173 
One very important consequence is the negative implication of 
the principle: when contemplated alternative expertise is not 
discernibly more reliable, or when such discernibly more reliable 
expertise is not reasonably available to the proponent, either because 
it is impossible to acquire or because the costs of its acquisition would 
be disproportionate to the stakes involved, this principle provides no 
exclusionary authority.  The best that is reasonably available should 
be admitted, at least so far as the reliability requirement of Rule 702 
is concerned.  Beyond that, an important limiting principle again 
places the better evidence idea within an adversarial context.  
Specifically, when the discernibly more reliable expertise is 
reasonably available to the opponent to present if the opponent should 
deem it worthwhile, then no exclusion of evidence is warranted; in 
most cases adversarial incentives should suffice to provide the 
necessary assistance to the jury.174  Thus, upon a challenge that 
 
otherwise, but can, and in this context should, involve a context-dependent 
assessment of what can be gained by excluding proffered evidence.  See Dale A. 
Nance, Conditional Probative Value and the Reconstruction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 419, 454-56 (1995) (emphasizing the importance of this distinction 
in the context of doctrines supposed to rest on the concept of conditional 
relevance). 
 173 That is part of the reason that it is sub-optimal to leave the question of whether 
better evidence is reasonably available to the jury’s evaluation of evidential weight.  
Of course, the more important reason not to leave the matter to the jury is that the 
jury can be assisted by having the better evidence.  See supra note 121. 
 174 For the unusual case in which the more reliable expertise, although available 
to the opponent (thus making exclusion of proponent’s less reliable expertise 
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identifies the potentially better evidence that should be brought to 
bear and convinces the trial judge that such evidence is not 
reasonably available to the challenger, the proponent would bear the 
burden of convincing the trial judge that such evidence either is not 
significantly more reliable or is not reasonably available to the 
proponent.  Once again, it is this placement of a burden on the 
proponent, coupled with the facilitative judicial viewpoint explained 
above, that serves to distinguish the reliability inquiry of Rule 702 
from the somewhat similar balancing test of Rule 403. 
In order to be more concrete, and to indicate qualifications to 
the foregoing general principles, it is necessary to distinguish two 
contexts in which an objection might be raised.  As a general 
proposition, expert testimony can be divided into two components, 
each of which might be subject to a reliability challenge: (a) the non-
case-specific information or general explanatory theory or technique 
that is to be conveyed or applied—essentially the matters addressed 
by Rule 702(1) & (2); and (b) the application of such information to 
the specifics of the litigated case, usually by presenting an opinion—
addressed by Rule 702(3).175  When an objection based on the better 
evidence idea is raised with regard to the first component, the issue 
concerns whether or not to expand the informational or theoretical 
resources brought to bear on the case.  The potential costs thereof 
are greater than when the objection concerns the form or content of 
the expert’s opinion.  A problem with the latter can be corrected with 
relatively little cost by adjusting the expert’s testimony.  While the 
opponent may be able to induce concessions on cross-examination as 
to the weakness of a particular opinion, there is sometimes 
considerable inconvenience to the jury, and no compelling need, to 
require such a delay.176  The following subsections consider these two 
contexts in more detail. 
— Testimonial Form and Content.  Current practice is often overly 
 
unwarranted), is not presented by either side, the trial court retains the option of 
seeking court-appointed expert assistance.  See FED. R. EVID. 706. 
 175 In the interests of both accuracy and uniformity, the deference to trial court 
discretion mandated by General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997), in terms 
of the standard of appellate review, should be construed to apply only to the latter, 
and even in the latter context, some issues may transcend the particular case and 
require rulings as a matter of law that are reviewed de novo.  See Saks, supra note 39, at 
231-35. 
 176 The same point lies behind the exclusion of lay opinion in favor of more 
concrete factual reports.  See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 11 
(characterizing the modern lay opinion rule as a rule of excusable preference that is 
enforced notwithstanding the opportunity of an opponent to develop the more 
concrete facts on cross-examination). 
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generous to proponents in allowing opinions on case-specific 
material facts, ultimate or not, when those facts are not within the 
personal knowledge of the expert.  Although Rule 704 rightly swept 
away the per se exclusion of opinions on ultimate issues,177 courts have 
failed adequately to heed an important caveat to that change: 
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so 
as to admit all opinions.  Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must 
be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion 
of evidence which wastes time.  These provisions afford ample 
assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely 
tell the jury what result to reach . . . .178 
Overly generous allowance of opinions on such ultimate issues is a 
major contributing cause of many perceived problems in the use of 
experts.179 
Modern developments in forensics theory point the way to 
improvements in conventional practice consistent with the better 
evidence inquiry.  Specifically, it would be better to require an expert, 
whenever practicable, to frame testimony in a way that effectively 
communicates a likelihood ratio for the case-specific facts to which 
the expert’s explanatory theory applies.180  If the data are not 
available that would allow quantitative or even qualitative measures of 
the likelihood ratio, then the expert, again to the extent practicable, 
should be limited to providing specialized information that the jury 
can use to reach its own, typically intuitive sense of the likelihood 
ratio.181  Such restriction of testimony recognizes that, for the expert 
to give an opinion on an ultimate issue, the expert must implicitly 
weigh the other evidence in a case, including evidence that goes 
beyond any expert’s asserted expertise.182 
 
 177 See FED. R EVID. 704 (now prohibiting opinions on ultimate issues only in the 
context of testimony regarding the mental state or condition of a criminal 
defendant). 
 178 FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note. 
 179 See Risinger, supra note 73, at 767 (citing generous treatment of ultimate issue 
opinions as well as liberal rules of evidentiary sufficiency). 
 180 Of course, the best way to communicate a likelihood ratio, when it can be at 
least partly quantified, is a difficult matter.  See, e.g., Nance & Morris, supra note 137 
(investigating different presentation formats for evidence with a quantifiable random 
match frequency); Samuel Lindsey, et al., Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, 43 
JURIMETRICS J. 147 (2003) (investigating additional formats). 
 181 Some such developments are indeed occurring, in areas such as handwriting 
identification.  See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE 
ISSUES § 3-1.4.3 (2002) (discussing post-Kumho cases in which courts have admitted 
expert testimony about similarities in handwriting but excluded the expert’s opinion 
on the identity of the writer). 
 182 See Richard Friedman et al., Expert Testimony on Fingerprints: An Internet Exchange, 
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It would unduly prolong this paper to explain these positions in 
detail, and with the necessary qualifications.  It implicates the 
recurring dilemma of whether expert testimony should provide 
appropriate education for the jury or, instead, provide simply the 
occasion for the jury to defer to the opinions of the more credible 
expert.183  But at least I can say this: If an expert’s opinion is rejected 
under Rule 702 (as distinct from Rule 403) on the ground that it goes 
too far beyond what the foundational facts and principles would seem 
to warrant, that rejection should not be justified on the ground that 
the proffered opinion is “unwarranted,” while a more conservative 
opinion is “warranted,” except insofar as this is taken as an indirect 
way of saying that the more conservative opinion is better warranted 
within the scope of the expertise than the opinion originally 
proffered.184 
A second, surely less controversial application of preferential 
regulation of the form of testimony provides the most plausible 
argument for a certain deference to non-legal institutional norms.  
When an expert witness asserts, explicitly or implicitly, that the basis 
for his testimony is a body of knowledge that meets the standards of 
some discipline, then it is only fair to hold the witness to such 
standards.  Thus, a witness who claims his field is “scientific” may 
 
43 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 94, 98 (2002) (indicating my arguments regarding this point in 
the context of fingerprint evidence).  See generally ROBERTSON & VIGNAUX, supra note 
91, § 4.4 (arguing that experts ordinarily should not give opinions on the ultimate 
issue or any material fact in a case not directly observed by the expert, but should 
rather provide testimony that communicates the strength of the evidence to which 
their expertise relates by providing its likelihood ratio). 
 183 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: 
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993).  This, of course, is also a 
matter of degree, not a categorical choice.  See Allen, supra note 51, at 1160 n.9.  
Educational presentations should be preferred over ones that merely invite 
deference except to the extent that the nature of the expertise makes this 
impracticable.  See generally D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional 
Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 2-2.2 
to 2.3 (expressing preference, ceteris paribus, for “summarizational” expertise over 
“translational” expertise). 
 184 Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 44-45 (describing the more aggressive 
opinion, prone to a higher error rate, as unsupported by its foundation).  The acid 
test would be presented by a case in which the more aggressive opinion comes from 
an unavailable expert declarant who based his opinion on non-replicable 
observations and whose opinion is presented as hearsay not excluded as such.  Under 
the binary approach, an unwarranted opinion does not become warranted by the 
declarant’s being unavailable and the test being non-replicable.  Under my 
comparative preference approach, such hearsay would not be inadmissible by virtue 
of the reliability requirement of Rule 702 as adumbrated in this section.  Cf. 1 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 18 (arguing that lay opinions from 
unavailable hearsay declarants should be exempt from a preference for more 
concrete facts that would apply if the declarant testified). 
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properly be held (in part) to standards of the scientific community, 
to the extent they can be identified.  This is no small problem: 
A large element of politics drives many ostensibly scientific 
findings.  The quality of much of the science that is urged on 
courts is, to put it mildly, weak.  In fact, it is not science at all.  
Many claims to science are really assertions of policy wrapped in 
the guise of science.185 
In such contexts, a consideration of scientific standards of reliability 
is appropriate, but even here it will only rarely be a binary 
determination.  Rather, the degree of scientific validity in fact present 
will matter as part of the process of comparing the probative value of 
the offered testimony and its tendency to mislead with that of a more 
modest testimonial assertion.186  And this is true even if, but for such 
an assertion by the proponent, the standards of the scientific 
community are not those that the law should embrace as pertinent to 
the litigation.  For example, even if the law in a particular context 
need not demand the level of certainty associated with conventional 
scientific standards of statistical significance (e.g., a 95% confidence 
level),187 an expert who falsely presents to the jury as working with 
knowledge that does meet that standard should ordinarily not be 
allowed to attempt in this way to mislead the trier of fact.  This, 
however, also explains why a more modest claim by the expert witness 
might rationally lead to admission of the testimony.188  The point is 
not to exclude expertise just because it is not scientifically sound, 
whatever that may mean, but rather to assure that the testimony is as 
helpful to the trier of fact as it can be, whether the testimony is 
commonly regarded as scientific or not. 
Attributing such significance to the expert’s assertions is 
reasonably compatible with both Daubert and Kumho Tire.189  The 
 
 185 FAIGMAN, supra note 46, at 71; see also FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 38, at 209-24 
(illustrating rhetorical strategies used by parties and their experts in an effort to 
misrepresent the available scientific knowledge). 
 186 Reference to a tendency to mislead does not mean that we have moved back 
into the realm of jury credulity as the grounds of exclusion.  The concern here is 
with the attempt to mislead.  There is no need to countenance such attempts, even if 
they are only rarely or never successful.  See The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 120, 
at 291-92. 
 187 See supra note 51. 
 188 See FAIGMAN, supra note 46, at 77. 
 189 The idea of invoking the deferential form of the Daubert inquiry only in 
situations in which the expert asserts a scientific basis has been “in the air” at 
conferences, but I am unable to attribute the idea to its originator.  It would appear 
to be a position taken in print by Professor Michael Saks.  See Saks, supra note 39, at 
237-38 (“The particular regime for scrutinizing ‘scientific expert testimony’ detailed 
in Daubert emerged because that was the type of asserted expertise before the Court.”) 
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opinion in Daubert emphasized somewhat ambiguously that its 
deference to norms of scientific validity was premised on the “nature 
of the expertise offered” in that case,190 and stated its holding only in 
the context in which a trial judge is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert 
scientific testimony.”191  And the concern expressed in Kumho Tire, 
that the existence of a reliability requirement not depend on the 
category at issue, is not seriously implicated in relying on the expert’s 
assertions.  It is one thing to require trial judges to categorize all 
expertise as scientific or non-scientific, independent of the witness’s 
claims;192 it is another to hold the expert to the standards that the 
expert asserts underlies the testimony.  Furthermore, a witness 
cannot escape all reliability scrutiny just by disclaiming any scientific 
or other methodological basis.193  Regardless of assertions, such 
expertise would have to satisfy the reliability requirements described 
in the following paragraphs. 
—Testimonial Bases.  With regard to the general data, techniques, 
and theories brought to bear by the expert—the issues addressed by 
Rule 702(1) & (2)—in a very real sense the question is not about 
excluding anything; it is about including something.  That is, 
exclusion of proffered expertise, under this prong of the analysis, 
would have the purpose of expressing a preference for the proponent 
to expand the data considered by the court, or to include an 
additional, more reliable technique, and so forth.  Importantly, once 
that additional information is presented, if it is, the exclusionary 
principle here expressed loses its point, and the originally challenged 
testimony, if not inherently altered by the addition, may be 
admissible.194  For example, if a civil plaintiff in a toxic tort case offers 
structure-activity and in vitro studies, and the court is considering 
excluding the plaintiff’s evidence in order to express a preference for 
epidemiological evidence of human teratogenicity, there would then 
 
(emphasis supplied). 
 190 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. 
 191 Id. at 592.  The ambiguity is that the Court might mean either (1) that the 
proponent happened to offer evidence that the Court regards as scientific, or (2) 
that the proponent happened to offer evidence as scientific. 
 192 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151 (“We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a 
schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of 
questions to certain kinds of experts.”) 
 193 This was a dangerous trend in the wake of Daubert and before Kumho Tire.  See 
id. at 237. 
 194 While this may seem counterintuitive, it is actually a familiar admissibility 
structure.  Cf. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1190 
(Chadbourn rev. 1972) (noting that preference for original under original 
document rule is exhausted by introduction of original, so that copy may then be 
admitted, even to prove contents of the document, subject only to other rules). 
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be no point in excluding the challenged evidence under the present 
analysis if the indication is that such preferred evidence will be 
introduced, whether by plaintiff or defendant.195 
When it is not clear to the court that the preferred evidence has 
been or will be presented without excluding that which is proffered, 
exclusion is appropriate on this theory only when more reliable 
expertise is (a) reasonably available to the proponent, and (b) not 
reasonably available to the opponent.  As gross generalizations, such 
a test will place greater demands on the prosecution than on the 
accused in criminal cases, and it will place greater demands on 
powerful civil defendants than on impecunious civil plaintiffs.  The 
question of the resources that a party can bring to bear on improving 
expertise is thus of crucial importance, rather than the question of 
the burden of proof against which that party is operating, although 
the two are not of course totally unrelated.  I consider imprecise, 
therefore, maxims that would vary the level of judicial scrutiny 
according to the burden of proof borne by the proponent.196  The 
latter principle also tempts us, once again, to conflate admissibility 
with sufficiency. 
The indicated assessments of availability should not exalt form 
over substance.  A seemingly impecunious civil plaintiff may be 
associated with a resourceful repeat player, such as a subrogating 
insurance company or a well-heeled personal injury firm.  These facts 
should matter in the trial court’s assessment.  Nevertheless, it would 
not be implausible to create one categorical privilege against the 
operation of this principle, a privilege protecting the accused in a 
criminal case.197  Even in the unusual case in which the accused is 
 
 195 I find problematic, therefore, those cases that exclude plaintiff’s toxicology 
evidence just because substantial contrary epidemiological evidence is present.  See 
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 7-1.3.1[1], at 290.  Once again, this is a sufficiency 
question, pure and simple, and should be handled as such.  See id. § 8-1.6.6.  To be 
sure, exclusion on grounds other than the reliability requirement of Rule 702, 
including the ground that the toxicology evidence is simply a waste of time, might be 
warranted, provided of course such an exclusionary rationale is not a sufficiency 
determination in disguise.  See id. § 8-1.6.5.  When the issue is whether to exclude an 
expert’s opinion in order to express a preference for more reliable background 
information in the foundation of the opinion, then the exclusion also implicates the 
previous discussion of exercising control over the testimonial form and content, at 
least insofar as the expert might be required to opine based on the augmented 
information base.  In many cases, this can be done adequately on cross-examination, 
and there is then no need to exclude the opinion originally proffered. 
 196 “All things being equal, the higher the standard of proof applicable to the 
issue upon which the expertise is offered, the higher the required threshold 
dependability should be.”  Risinger, supra note 183, § 2-4.0, at 89. 
 197 This would mute concerns over the unfairness of strict application of Daubert to 
evidence offered by the accused.  See Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in 
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wealthy, it may be unwise to allow courts to apply a nominally 
symmetrical admissibility principle to exclude relevant expertise 
offered by the accused, in view of the apparent tendency of the courts 
to apply such principles more strictly to the accused than to the 
prosecution.198  Such a privilege would also obviate concerns over the 
constitutionality of excluding expertise offered by the accused.199  
Somewhat more debatably, but of more practical importance, the 
accused might be privileged not to have to show, as a condition of 
excluding the prosecution’s expertise on this theory, that the more 
reliable expertise cannot reasonably be presented by the accused. 
Three further refinements are worth attention here.  First, 
constraints on the development of more reliable expertise may be 
non-monetary.  Ethical and legal restrictions on human 
experimentation are obvious constraints that do more than raise the 
monetary costs of developing new information.200  The point may 
have surprisingly broad implications.  Even established medical 
practices may have evolved over time or been articulated in 
consensus-based “practice guidelines” without being subjected to 
rigorous empirical testing.201  In recent years this has helped to spawn 
a movement for “evidence-based medicine,”202 in some respects the 
medical profession’s version of Daubert.203  In contemplating an 
exclusionary response under the principle of demanding better 
evidence, courts may encounter ethical or legal restrictions on 
 
Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 105 (2003) (arguing that the “positivist push” 
of Daubert, if taken seriously, will unfairly disadvantage the accused, in part because 
of resource disparities). 
 198 See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (reporting results of an 
empirical analysis of decisions). 
 199 Cf. United States v. Scheffler, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (rejecting, over one dissent, 
a constitutional argument under the Compulsory Process Clause that accused should 
be privileged to introduce favorable polygraph evidence in the face of an explicit 
exclusionary rule in the Military Rules of Evidence). 
 200 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 7-2.3.2, at 313 (noting ethical limitations on 
the use of randomized controlled trials in epidemiology). 
 201 See, e.g., Fiona Godlee, Getting Evidence Into Practice, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 6 (1998) 
(“[M]any of the questions that arise in daily clinical practice remain unaddressed by 
well designed research.”); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The 
Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines,  26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 327, 328-29 
(2001) (noting that even some clinical practice guidelines have not been developed 
using evidence-based medicine). 
 202 See generally D.L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE 
AND TEACH EBM (2d ed. 2000). 
 203 See Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH 
POL., POL’Y & L. 267, 287 (2001) (“Science-based medical evidence and the Daubert 
trilogy reflect unorchestrated parallel movements in medicine and law about how to 
assess expertise critically.”). 
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human experimentation, including the requirement of informed 
consent, that limit the ability of researchers to test the efficacy of now 
conventional practices or the causal assumptions on which they were 
originally based.204  Considerations such as these will sometimes 
warrant the admission of expertise that otherwise might fail the 
reliability test, especially in regard to establishing the standard of care 
in professional malpractice.205  In any event, the “cost” consideration 
involved in making such determinations is, always in theory and often 
in practice, a richly textured normative consideration. 
The second refinement to be noted is that greater reliability 
might be unavailable to a party within the context of a particular case 
(even considering the matter retroactively from the beginning of the 
litigation), yet reasonably available to that party within the context of 
repeated litigation of the same or similar issue.  At the outer reaches 
of the better evidence idea, repeat players, such as the state in regard 
to forensic science techniques, may plausibly be considered in regard 
to the long run of cases, rather than based on what is reasonably 
available in the short run to address a particular case.206  In such 
contexts, it would be important that the prosecution, or other repeat 
player, be given reasonable notice of the courts’ intention to reject 
expertise.  Such notice need not come in the form of the rejection of 
expertise offered in a particular case, however, for a court might 
admit expertise while at the same time serving warning that in the 
future such expertise will be rejected for want of sufficient reliability. 
The third refinement once again takes account of the adversarial 
nature of the proceedings.  Suppose that the prosecution offers 
 
 204 In addition to problems of informed consent, there is significant controversy 
over the proper restrictions on the use of placebo-controlled experiments, which 
would be necessary to test the efficacy of conventional practices.  See, e.g., Sharona 
Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or Unethical Practice?, 
33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 451 (2001) (noting that the principle of beneficence militates 
against the inclusion of placebos in clinical trials under most if not all circumstances 
in which a standard therapy exists, and arguing for a compromise position 
significantly limiting the use of placebo-controlled studies).  But see ROBERT J. LEVINE, 
THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 4-5 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that 
even established practices may be, and in appropriate cases should be, considered 
“unvalidated” for purposes of applying ethical and legal principles controlling 
experimentation, thus muting the principle of beneficence). 
 205 This, of course, assumes that courts will come around to applying the reliability 
requirement of Daubert/Kumho to conventional medical testimony.  See Shuman, 
supra note 203, at 277-82 (observing that Daubert has been largely ignored in civil 
cases outside the contexts of toxic torts and products liability).  It is difficult to see 
how jurisdictions controlled by the 2000 amendment of Rule 702 can avoid this 
extension much longer. 
 206 See REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 126 (emphasizing the peculiar force of the best 
evidence principle when applied to the state in a criminal case). 
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questioned document examiner testimony to identify the accused as 
the writer of a ransom note, and assume that the court holds this 
testimony inadmissible because (1) error rates have not been 
established for this expert or even for the average comparably-trained 
expert, (2) tests to determine such error rates could be easily 
developed by or at the insistence of the state, and (3) such tests could 
not be practically undertaken by the accused in this case.  The state 
proceeds without this expertise, because it cannot conduct the tests 
(or cause other agencies to do so) within the time frame of the 
present trial.  Suppose, then, that the accused offers exactly the same 
kind of handwriting identification testimony, except of course that it 
is exonerative.  Applying the principles as announced above, the trial 
judge concludes that the latter testimony should not be excluded 
because the better expertise (that which is accompanied by error rate 
information) cannot be reasonably obtained by the accused or 
because the accused is privileged not to have to make a showing of 
unavailability.  This would present a problem.  The accused would be 
allowed to present evidence of the same degree of reliability as that 
which the prosecution is precluded from introducing.  That might 
seem unfair to the state, even if adequate notice of the court’s 
concern was given to the state in previous decisions. 
Is this a serious problem?  At one level, the answer might be, 
“No.”  If the goal of the admissibility structure were solely to induce 
improvements in the quality of expertise, then one can hardly 
imagine a better system.  Faced with the prospect that the accused 
will be able to provide exonerative testimony while the prosecution 
will be unable to present inculpatory testimony from the same 
discipline, the state will have a very powerful incentive—stronger 
than if neither side or both sides could use such evidence—to 
investigate further the reliability of that form of expertise in order to 
assure either that the prosecution could introduce such evidence or 
that the defense could not.207  However, the goal is not to improve 
future reliability at any cost; accuracy in the present case ought not 
be completely subordinated to accuracy in future cases.  A balance 
must be struck, and I suggest a compromise that would allow the 
prosecution, in the hypothetical described above, to offer rebuttal 
evidence using expert testimony of the same type, in this case 
handwriting identification testimony that is not significantly less 
 
 207 The latter would be possible if, for example, the research showed facts 
rendering the defense testimony inadmissible under Rule 403 or conditionally 
admissible if the defense expert provides a more conservative opinion, as explained 
above. 
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reliable than that which the accused has introduced.208  The accused 
would, however, retain the option to foreclose this line of inquiry by 
not offering such testimony.209  The same rebuttal structure would be 
employed in civil cases when a similar asymmetry of evidentiary 
options occurs.  Such a balance would retain significant pressure for 
the long-run improvement of the reliability of under-validated 
expertise without creating unfairness and potentially distorted 
interim verdicts.210 
The foregoing considerations obviously do not exhaust the kinds 
of issues that would need to be addressed.  I have tried only to 
present a framework that can be developed, refined, or modified as 
further thought on the matter proceeds.  Many of the details cannot 
be perfectly anticipated and would need to be addressed in the 
traditional common-law manner as particular issues arise.211  But the 
 
 208 The problem is similar to, but not the same as, the problem discussed above in 
connection with the previously considered principle for marshaling cognitive 
resources.  See supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text.  The similarity lies in the 
risk of negative inferences by the jury from a party’s (here, the prosecution’s) failure 
to introduce evidence the jury would expect to receive.  The main differences lie in 
the greater need for a remedy—because here the prosecution has no other expertise 
on the issue—and in the fact that a remedy is available in the present context that 
does not so dramatically undermine the purpose of the exclusion. 
 209 The structure would parallel that used for character evidence, in which the 
accused has the option of opening the door to character evidence with the 
understanding that the prosecution can reply in kind.  See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), 
(2). 
 210 The degree of pressure can be adjusted, moreover, by choices about the timing 
of the contemplated “rebuttal.”  For example, we can choose whether to allow the 
prosecution to offer the undervalidated handwriting expertise only at the formal 
rebuttal stage, which would mean the prosecution would have to survive a motion to 
dismiss at the end of its case-in-chief without the benefit of that testimony, or else to 
require the defense to indicate its intention to use its handwriting expertise and then 
allow the prosecution to anticipate that use by introducing its undervalidated experts 
in its case-in-chief.  I am inclined to believe the former solution gives a better 
balance, but others may disagree. 
 211 Professor Imwinkelried sees in the resolution of these issues a multiplication of 
preliminary issues affecting admissibility, and he fears that this will operate to the 
disadvantage of financially weaker parties.  See Imwinkelried, supra note 98, at 283-85.  
The issues are complex, to be sure, but this is not substantially more so under my 
proposed interpretations than under current practice.  Reliability determinations, 
using the Daubert factors and similar factors articulated after Daubert, already are 
complicated matters.  How could they be otherwise?  My framework adds certain 
factors to be considered, to be sure, but if my argument—that some such proposal 
must be developed to make reliability standards coherent—is correct, then any 
marginal increase in complexity is in the nature of the beast; conceptually 
incoherent reliability determinations certainly cannot be justified on the ground that 
they are simpler to state.  If the costs of complexity are not worth the gains from a 
coherent reliability inquiry, then the answer lies in rejecting the reliability 
requirement itself. 
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underlying theme should be clear enough: courts should not exclude 
expert testimony (under Rule 702) just because it is “unreliable” 
simpliciter, but only because (and when) by doing so, the reliability of 
the expert testimony, in this or future cases, can be noticeably 
improved.212 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The general thrust of Daubert, that the judiciary should take a 
more active role in monitoring the use of expertise in court, may be 
entirely sound.  If so, however, it might have been better had the law 
of expert testimony not taken the path it has.  Perhaps the demand 
for reliability, as a condition of admissibility, is a conceptually poor 
substitute for judges taking more seriously their responsibility to 
grant directed verdicts and summary judgments when expert 
testimony, taken in conjunction with non-expert evidence relating to 
the same essential element of a cause of action or defense, is too weak 
to support a rational verdict favorable to its proponent.213  Personally, 
I am inclined to think so, at least so long as the burden of production 
is rightly understood.214 
 
 212 This, it will be noticed, is a necessary condition for exclusion, not a sufficient 
condition.  It might be the case, for example, that excluding expertise offered by a 
party without significant economic or political power, such as a criminal defendant 
or impecunious civil plaintiff, would cause the community of experts, as repeat 
players themselves, to test their methods so as to improve their degree of reliability in 
a cost justified manner.  Professor Faigman seems to believe that this would be 
enough to warrant exclusion, without regard to the resources of the proponent.  See 
Faigman, supra note 68, at 261-64.  I am indebted to him for pressing me on this 
point and thus requiring me to articulate the reason for my focus on party resources 
rather than expert-community resources.  The reason is this: To use the present 
litigant solely as a means to the end of improving expertise offered in subsequent 
trials involving other parties is unfair, a violation of a categorical imperative never to 
use others solely as means to an end.  For the litigant who must take what he or she 
finds in terms of the reliability of available expertise, Rule 702 should allow the 
litigant to use the best of what is available.  If such use of available expertise is 
considered problematic nonetheless, it would seem more properly to be the subject 
of direct regulation of the expert community, which would invoke a different 
justificatory framework with its own set of issues.  On the other hand, to the extent 
that a litigant bears some responsibility for the current level of reliability of the 
challenged expertise—a responsibility arising out of access to or creation of data, 
investigative economies of scale, or political power—it is fair to deprive the litigant of 
expertise that does not attain the degree of reliability that those resources make 
possible and desirable, given the nature of the case. 
 213 Professor Friedman argues forcefully along these lines.  See Friedman, supra 
note 89. 
 214 See Nance, supra note 121 (arguing that the burden of production should be 
understood to embrace an obligation to assure that evidence is reasonably 
complete). 
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Be that as it may, Daubert, Kumho Tire, and amended Rule 702 
have marked out a different, rockier conceptual path, and at least for 
the time being, we must try to make the most of it.  The use of a 
dichotomous concept of reliability, whether or not founded on 
deference to a non-legal discipline, simply poses too many problems.  
These problems, in turn, encourage an epistemically invasive use of 
admissibility to monitor the weight of the evidence.  It is time to turn 
away from that kind of thinking and try another tack, one that draws 
on more manageable comparative reliability assessments that build 
on a gradational concept of reliability. 
In this paper I have argued that if we set aside the generally 
unfounded concerns about juror credulity, we can still fashion 
criteria of admissibility under Rule 702 that reflect the gatekeeping 
mandate of the post-Daubert regime while employing such a 
comparative assessment methodology.  These criteria could assist the 
trier of fact by (1) marshaling its cognitive resources around the 
relatively reliable forms of expertise each party offers, and/or (2) 
providing appropriate incentives for parties to discover, develop, or 
present more reliable expertise than would otherwise be presented in 
court.  While the case for the former is still relatively weak and 
undeveloped, the case for the latter is stronger.  Careful use of the 
latter, if not also the former, could effect a change for the better, 
both in terms of the substance of the admissibility rulings and in 
terms of the consistency and coherence of those rulings. 
 
